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HARRY S. TRUMAN. A STUDY OF THE RHETORIC 
OF LIMITED COMMITMENT 
CHAPTER I 
NATURE OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
There can be little doubt about the strategic importance of 
Harry S. Truman's place in history. During the years that he occupied 
the White House, from 1945 to 1953, the times were such that he was 
required to make more critical decisions than perhaps any of his 
predecessors. Not even President Roosevelt faced the awesome likelihood, 
as did Truman, of tr1gger1ng with a single utterance, a nuclear holocaust. 
As Lou, s W. Koen, g contended, rn h1 s book The Truman Admrni strati on, 11 the 
diff1cult1es with which Harry S. Truman was beset and hedged about when 
and Just after he succeeded to the presidency are not likely ever to be 
overestimated, and to overstate them would be nexi: to imposs1ble. 111 
One such difficuli: decision grew out of the question in 1950 of 
providing support for South Korea (Republic of Korea) in its efforts to 
counter an expansionist move by the Communists. When the news of 
Truman's decision to support South Kotea became public, the American 
people responded with an enthus1ast1c endorsement of the President's 
ac c 1 on. In the words of James Res ton of the New York Times· 11The 
dec1s1on to meet the Communist challenge 1n Korea has produced a trans-
formatio~ 1n the spirit of the United States Government. There have 
1 
2 
been some d1 fferences 1 n the 1 ast seventy-t~110 hours over how to react 
to the Communist invasion, but ... these differences have apparently 
been swept away by the general conviction that the dangers of 1nact1on 
2 were greater than the bold action taken by the President. 11 The tide 
of favorable sentiment for the President was not confined just to 
Washington. From throughout the country, letters and telegrams poured 
1n to the White House, running ten-to-one 1n favor of the President 1 s 
decision. Even Thomas Dewey, Truman 1 s 1948 opponent, wired a message 
stating: 11 I wholeheartedly agree with and support the difficult dec1s10n 
you have made. 113 
Unfortunately for President Truman, his overwhelming political 
I 
and public support proved short-lived The decision to back the South 
Koreans brought Truman out of an e1gbteen-month popularity decl1n~ 
1n June only to begin another decline shortly thereafter. In fact, 
when the pu~l1c opinion polls are matched with the dates of Truman's 
first two national addresses (July 19 and September l): there 1s little 
evidence that the speeches resulted in any s1gnif1cant opI~1on shift 
1n Truman 1 s d1rect1on. In both of his two addresses, Truman spent 
considerable effort demonstrating that America was forced by the Commttr11st 
aggression to respond positively, as well as alluding to a world-wide 
Communist threat The foreshadowing of Truman 1 s failure to hold the 
support of the American people 1s v1v1dly expressed rn the fol1owrng 
statement by Senator L~1ley. 
I speak now abou~ the world s1 tudt1on as 1t confronts us toddy. 
The ne\,1spapers say there 1s a feel1rg of rel 1ef 111 1"1ashrngton now 
that b1~k~r1~g and 1~d~c1s1on has d1sapp2ared and that w~ are 
ra"lly1Pg co the Pres1dent 1 s support I ::.m noc sure tr,at r.hat 
feel1ns no½ exists ~o the excent 1t did 1mm2d1ately 2fLe~ ~he 
President sent American forces to V:.o.,..2a I am sure Lhu.t rn thr-.; 
h111terlcnd peop"ie arie th1nk1ng, aM thrnk.ing and th1nk~r1q about 
where ½e are go1rg r 
3 
Purpose of the Study 
Since Truman was unable to hold the support of the American 
people so overwhelmingly given initially, the primary focus of this 
study will be to determine the relationship between Truman, his 
rhetoric, the nature of the war, and Truman's decline in popularity 
following the outset of the war. The purpose of this study 1s threefold: 
(1) to determine the nature of Truman's rhetorical defense of American 
intervention 1n the Korean Conflict, i.e., the arguments for which he 
sought support, the appeals he used, and the target audiences he tried 
to reach and influence; (2) to describe and interpret the effects of his 
rhetoric by correlating his arguments or claims with his shifts in 
popularity and with his subsequent rhetorical tactics; and (3) to 
assess Truman 1 s rhetoric in light of the choices available to him, and 
his perception of the nature of the situation he faced and the audiences 
he addressed. The scope of this 1nvestigat1on is l1m1ted to an intensive 
concern with two speeches, both of which were addressed to the ~ation, 
both about the conflict in Korea, and both representative of Truman's 
view of his role as a tough-minded negotiator with the Russians. 
Although Truman made numerous public statements during the period being 
studied (June 25 - November 30, 1950), he delivered only two maJor 
addresses to the nation on the matter of Korea. Since these two addresses 
set the stage, rhetorically, between Truman and his aud1ences and America 
and other nations, and obviously represent the purest form of tbought-
out response by President Truman, analysis will be confined to chese 
speeches. 
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Reasons for the Study 
The importance of Truman's place in history seems to be increasing 
with the passage of time. Although Truman's popularity from 1945 to July 
1950 vacillated from a high of eighty-seven percent to a low of thirty-
two percent, he maintained an average of approximately forty-five percent. 
From a low for the year 1950 of thirty-seven percent in June, Truman's 
popularity increased to forty-six percent in July. 5 It should be 
pointed out that the percentage of public support expressed here is based 
on the opinion of the public concerning the President's overall handling 
of his job. A survey conducted by the American Institute of Public 
Opinion on June 27, showed eighty-one percent of the people favored the 
President's decision on Korea and thirteen percent disapproved of the 
dec1s1on. Two months later on August 18, a similar survey showed sixty-
five percent favored the President 1 s decision while tHenty percent did 
not. 6 
The expression of public confidence given to the President's 
overall handling of his Job reached a high of forty-six percent 1n July~ 
In the same month, however, public support began a decline, and eventually 
reached twenty-six percent by February, 1951. From this all time low, 
Truman's overall popularity, according to the Gallup Poll, never rose 
higher than thirty-one percent while he remained in off1ce .. 7 It seems 
clear that Truman 1 s decline 1n popular support was tied inextricably to 
the Korean Conflict and the posture he assumed toward 1t. Furthermore, 
Truman was unable to hold the w111 mg support of the Arner, can people, 
nor was he able to revive 1t once lost. 
The primary obJect1ve of this study is to produce a set of reasoned 
explanations about Truman 1 s seeming rhetorical failure, 1f indeed 1t can 
5 
be properly called that. There may be something about the American 
experience that makes historical successes out of rhetorical failures 
and vice versa. In any event, this study seeks an accounting and an 
explanation of Truman's attempts to influence the nation and the world 
during those tense months 1n 1950 when Russia and the United States 
were putting the persuasive 11 moves 11 on one another. 
Materials 
Information for this study has been drawn mainly from the Watson 
Library, University of Kansas, and the holdings of the Truman Library 1n 
Independence, M1ssour1. Of particular value 1n understanding Truman 1 s 
perception of himself, of his role as the President, and of the Russians 
are his two volumes of memoirs, his earlier book Mr. Citizen, his 
daughter's book Harry~ Truman, and William H1llman 1 s book Mr. President. 
The texts of Truman's two addresses were obtained 1n verbatum form from 
the Public Papers of the Presidents - Harry~ Truman - 1950, published 
by the United States Government Printing Office. 
Materials about Truman are plentiful and poss1bly run into the 
thousands. These include book-length scholarly studies such as The 
Crucial Decade, The Truman Presidency, and The Politics of Loyalty. 
There are like-wise several dozen unpublished theses and dissertations 
about Truman's life, career, administration, and political encounters. 
Only a few focus on his rhetoric, notably Michael S. Twedt's doctoral 
dissertation, "The War Rhetoric of Harry S Truman During the Korean 
Conf11ct. 118 None of these, however, are concerned primarily with the 
relationship between Truman's Korean rhetoric and his decline in public 
support. A full listing of relevant sources appears 1n the Bibliography. 
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Overview of Chapters 
The purpose of Chapter II will be to analyze the development of 
Truman as a rhetorical agent Of primary concern will be Truman's 
view of himself, his view of his fellow man and the world about him, 
and h1s effectiveness in adJust1ng other people to his ideas. 
The th1rd chapter will examine the ordinal relationship of 
events leading up to the invasion, the decision-making process, and 
the nature of the rhetorical situation 1n which Truman found himself. 
An analysis of the dynamic process of adJustment will be the 
focus of Chapter IV. This chapter will consist of a systematic treat-
/ 
ment of the two speeches in an attempt to determine what Truman was 
trying to do in his addresses, how he went about it, the bases underlying 
his appeals, and a determ1nat1on of the feasibility of his strategy. 
The final chapter will recapitulate the salient points of the 
study and the conclusions they suggest. The conclusions, however, w11l 
attempt to look beyond the immediate impl1cat1ons suggested and view the 
rhetoric of any President of the United States in terms of any future 
limited war situation. 
Footnotes 
1Lou1s W. Koenig, ed., The Truman Admin1strat1on (New York: New 
York University Press, 1956),P. l. 
2quoted 1n Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade (New York. Vintage 
Books, 1960), p. 157. 
3Ib1d., p. 158. 
4Ronald J. Car1d1, The Korean War and A~er1can Politics (Philadel-
phia· Un1vers1ty of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), p. 53. 
5Papers on Gallup Poll, American Institute of Publ1c Op1n1on, 
March 14, 1951 Truman L 1 brary. 
6Gallup Poll, October 4, 1950~ Truman L1brary 
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7Gallup Poll, March 14, 1951, Truman Library. 
8Mi chae l S. Twedt, "The War Rhetoric of Harry S. Truman During 
the Korean Confl1ct, 11 (unpublished Ph.D. d1ssertat1on, Un1vers1ty of 
Kansas, 1970). 
CHAPTER II 
TRUMAN 1 S DEVELOPMENT AS A RHETORICAL AGENT 
Introduction 
Just as the invasion of South Korea consisted of and was 
brought about by a finite number of relationships subsumed by the 
whole but requiring, in some cases, ident1fication and separate 
handling by the rhetor1c1an, of equal importance in the study of 
rhetoric, 1s the understanding of the man who suddenly found himself 
faced with the decision of whether to adJust himself to the situation, 
adjust the situation to himself, or both. Truman brought to the 
Korean crisis an unusual and varied background of interests, experiences, 
and lived wisdom, the totality of which constituted what can be called 
~is acquired ethos. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine 
those elements in the development of Truman's ethos that influenced 
h1s view of himself as a man of knowledge, energy, m1ss1on, determ1nat1on, 
and action. 
Early Life 
In early 1882, John Truman purchased for his bride Martha, 
a tiny frame house in Lamar, Missouri. Although the house ,was small, 
there was a yard and a big barn 1n the back that John planned to use 
1n his mule-trading business Martha, accL1stomed to better l1v1ng, 
accepted her 1mmed1ate plight and looked toward the brighter hopes 
of the future. 
Martha delivered a stillborn child 1n 1883, an event which 
8 
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depressed her for several months to follow, but she was soon expecting 
again. On May 8, 1884, she gave birth to a son who was destined to 
become the thirty-third President of the United States. His name 
was intended to be Harrison Shippe Truman, but Harrison was shortened 
to Harry and no agreement could be reached concerning his middle 
name, so his name was recorded as simply Harry S. Truman. 1 
Mule-trading was not good for the Trumans 1n Lamar, and when 
Harry was a year old his family moved to Harrisonville, south of Kansas 
City, only to find mule-trading poor there, too. At the age of three, 
Harry and his family moved to Grandview, Missouri to live with his 
grandparents. 
In 1890, after Harry's father had collected his part of Anderson 
Truman's small estate, the Trumans were moving again--th1s time to 
Independence, Missouri, a town of 6,000 people. 
Shortly before Harry started to school, his mother discovered 
that he was unable to read small print or recognize obJects close up. 
Upon examination by an oculist 1n Kansas City, it was discovered that 
he was suffering from severe hyperopia and would have to wear extremely 
thick-lensed glasses. Harry was somewhat of an accident-prone child. 
And with having to wear glasses constantly, he turned away from the 
usual rough-and-tumble kids' games to less physical activities. He 
frequented the Independence Library and read everything from novels to 
encyclopedias. By the time he was twelve, he had finished his second 
reading of the Bible. 
Young Harry soon found another act1v1ty to his lik1ng--play1ng 
the piano. After taking lessons 1n1t1ally from his mother at home, 
he eventually progressed to taking lessons from a Kansas City teacher 
10 
Twice a week Harry went for lessons, rising at 5·00 A.M. in order to 
get in two hours of practice before school. He continued his lessons 
until, at age fifteen, he suddenly quit. From comments made in later 
years, he apparently felt he had reached or was near his maximum 
potential, which he felt was not good enough to become a musician. 
In the summer of 1898, at the age of fourteen, Harry landed 
his first Job. For three dollars a week, he mopped the floor, swept 
the sidewalk, etc., at Clinton's Drug Store. This was his first 
acquaintance with the realities of the adult world and he was quite 
shocked to find some of the town's leading churchgoers stopping by 
each morning for a drink of liquor that Clinton kept behind the 
' prescription case. 
In Independence, Harry's father found success in the grain 
business and subsequently acquired political favor as well. At the 
1900 Democratic National Convention in Kansas City, Harry's father sat 
1n a special box with some prominent people including a member of 
the local political machine led by Jim Pendergast. With his father's 
2 help, Harry became a convention page. Later, recalling his first 
political convention, Truman said, 11 I remember that there were seventeen 
thous and peep 1 e in the o 1 d con vent 1 on ha 11 1t1hen W111 i am Jenn rngs Bryan 
spoke. His appeal that day was like nothing I have ever heard. He had 
a bell-1 i ke vo1 ce that carried well and he knew how to use it. 113 
The following year, 1n 1901, Harry graduated from high school. 
This was a real mark of achievement since in those days few boys stayed 
rn schoo 1. Harry \vas cons 1 dered a good student, though not the best rn 
class. According to Miss Tillie Brown, his high school English teacher, 
Harry wasn I t as bn 111 ant as Charl 1 e Ross, but he was 11 a determrned and 
11 
hard worker. 114 Charlie Ross was the class valedictorian. 
In summary, although the childhood of Harry Truman was crowded 
with dogs and cats, pigeons, and pet pigs, h1s mother ins1sted that room 
be made for books and music Harry's father had only the schooling 
available around Grandview, but h1s mother had attended a Baptist Female 
College in Livingston, Mis5our1. In looking at Harry Truman's early 
years, 1t is obvious that much of his perception of things and people 
was significantly influenced by his mother, his study of books, his poor 
eyesight, and his piano playing. 5 
After high school, Harry wanted to attend West Point, and he and 
Fielding Houchens, a friend, began the preparations under the tutelage 
of Miss Maggie Phelps, a high school teacher. After only a short period, 
however, Harry had his eyes examined at an Army recruiting station in 
Kansas City and found to his dis~ay that he could not meet West Point 
standards. Even had he qualified, Harry could not have gone to West 
Point because shortly after he received h1s high school diploma, his 
father experienced serious financial setbacks that were to plague the 
family for years to come. 
In early 1901, Harry's father was worth more than $30,000~ however, 
by the fall of 1901, his money was so tied up that Harry had to get a 
Job to help keep his brother Vivian and sister Mary Jane in school. 6 
Harry I s Job- -his f1 rst real Job--was as a timekeeper for the L. J. Smith 
Construction Company, where he v-1orked six days a week and earned thirty-
five dollars a month and board. At the time, Smith was contractor 1n 
charge of laying local trackage for the Santa Fe Railroad. Twice a day, 
Harry pumped a handcar between S~1th 1 s three camps to fill out the time 
tickets of 400 gandy dancers, or railroad hobos. His Job put h1m into 
12 
the company of rougher-talking men than he had ever experienced before. 
Although Harry may have appeared somewhat out of place in the midst of 
these roughnecks, when his contract ended in 1902, the foreman said, 
"Harry's all right. He's all right from his navel out rn every direction. 117 
Soon after, Harry took a Job in the mail room of the Kansas City Star, 
which paid seven dollars a week. 
Meanwhile, things had gone from bad to worse for Harry's father. 
He bought forty acres of worthless land in Oregon County, Missouri, 
sight unseen. 'Finances forced him to sell the family house and buy a 
cheaper one. Not long afterward, he had to sell the 160-acre farm the 
family had inherited from Solomon Young, that had been in the family 
for more than fifty years. Then suddenly he lost everything he had 
and went completely broke. He never recovered from the shock of his 
loss, and shortly thereafter took a Job as night watchman with an 
elevator company in Kansas C1 ty. H1 s sons went to work 'Ill th the 
National Bank of Commerce. 
Working in the caged section of the bank's basement, Harry soon 
found the work boring and dull. Ambitious and eager but without propects, 
Harry quit the bank 1n 1904 and went to work as a bookkeeper for the 
Union National Bank. At this point, Truman's circumstances began to 
change quickly. Harry's father traded his Kansas City house for a 
down payment on an 80-acre farm near Clin-con, and for the firs-c time in 
his life, Harry found he was on his own. 
The next year, Harry began his military career. On Flag Day, he 
enlisted in a sixty-man M1ssour1 National Guard unit and served two 
three-year hitches. Once a week, Private Truman paid a quarter to drill 
rn the armory and soon became number two man on a three-inch l i gh-c gun 
team. He became prof1c1ent 1n handling horses and even learned a little 
13 
about fencing and JUJitsu. Though only twenty-one years old, he was 
already remarkably well-rounded and experienced in human affairs. 
The year 1905 also brought another tragic event in the life of 
Harry's father. This time a flood washed away the entire corn crop on 
his Clinton farm. With virtually no other alternative, Harry's father 
and mother moved back to the farm in Grandview to live with Harry's 
widowed grandmother. 
When Harry was twenty-two, circumstances on the farm were such 
that Harry 1 s father asked him to give up his Job at the bank and help 
manage the Young farm. Since he never disobeyed his parents, Harry 
quit his Job and obediently returned to Grandview. For more than ten 
years, he routinely got up at 4:30 A.M. 1n the summer and 6:30 A.M. in 
the winter. On t~e 600-acre farm, there were days when Harry plowed, 
sowed, reaped, milked cows, fed hogs, doctored horses, baled hay and did 
a myriad of other chores. 8 Harry's mother of ten said, 11 It was on the 
farm that Harry got his common sense. He didn 1 t get 1t in town. 119 
While Harry was busy running the farm, his father began to indulge 
in politics, and attached himself to the growing Pendergast political 
machine that was reaching out from Kansas City into rural Jackson County. 
For his support, Harry's father was appointed an elections Judge in the 
Grandview precinct 1n 1906. Harry served as his clerk. In 1910, John 
Truman was named by a Pendergast-backed Judge as one of thirty-six road 
overseers. In this capacity he collected taxes and supervised a crew tnat 
worked on the roads. He also kept the Pendergast machine aware of the 
political atmosphere 1n his area. 
Most road overseers did very litLle actual work, but not John 
Truman. One day in the summer of 1914, while inspecting a road, he found 
a boulder blocking traffic. Instead of getting the crew whose function 
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was to handle such matters, he removed the rock himself. Later that 
day, he suffered severe stomach pains, and eventually developed an 
intestinal block. After an operation in Kansas City and what appeared 
to be a satisfactorily progressing convalescense, John Truman died. 
Harry said, 11 ! had been sitting with him and watching a long time. I 
fe 11 as 1 eep for a short time and when I woke up, he was dead. 11 1 O 
At the age of thirty, Harry found himself the man of the house. 
Not only did he manage the 600-acre farm, but 300 additional acres 
owned by his Uncle Harrison. He was given his father's old post of 
roacf overseer, but lost it later when an argument ensued over a proposed 
road-improvement program. In 1915, he was named postmaster of Grandview. 
By this time, Harry Truman had become very interested in politics 
and had been attending the weekly meetings of the Kansas City Tenth Ward 
Democratic Club for close to a year. Although Truman took politics 
seriously, apparently others did not consider him in the same light. 
Tom Evans, who later became one of Harry's closest friends, said, 11 If 
anyone there had been asked then 1f this quiet fellow had a political 
future, 1t would have got a big horse laugh. 1111 
Although Harry worked hard during the years he spent on the farm, 
there are several indications that farming did not adequately satisfy 
his energies and goals. For a while he traveled to Kansas City every 
week to attend National Guard meetings. He was carrying on an increas-
ingly successful courtship 1n Independence with Bess Wallace. And ,n 
1916, he turned to speculating 1n m1n1ng and later 1n 011. 
His interest in mining came first Harry, his friend Jerry 
Culbertson, and a man by the name of Tom Hughes, took an interest 1n 
a zinc mine at Commerce, Oklahoma. Culbertson claimed that the mine 
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contained rich veins that had been overlooked. Harry invested $2,000. 
After months of effort, there was no trace of metal. The ho1st1ng 
engineer, B111 Troop, asked Harry to raise another $2,500 for a drilling 
machine to be used in another operation in Picher, Oklahoma, but Harry 
couldn't raise the money. Recalling the situation later, he said, 11 If 
I I d done 1 t we I d be ro 11 mg rn weal th. 1112 
In September, 1916, Harry made a plunge in the 011 business. This 
venture cost him $5,000 in cash and $5,000 1n notes to be paid 1n ten 
months. The contract Truman signed with Culbertson, his former associate 
in the mining business, and David Morgan, was for a third interest 1n the 
firm of Morgan and Company. The contract established Truman as the 
company treasurer. Although it was agreed that Truman would continue to 
supervise the 600-acre Truman farm, he spent much of his time in town. 
Those who remember Truman during those days, remember him as being 
far-from-rustic. Farmer Truman had become a city man, too. 13 
For Truman the 01 l man, time was running out. "At the time the 
war came," Truman recalled, "we had a well down nine hundred feet on a 
three-hundred-and-twenty-acre lease at Eureka, Kansas$ 11 For reasons 
still not fully agreed upon, the Morris No. 1 well and the leased 
acreage were sold. Truman I s rnterpretat10n was: "My partners got into 
a fuss and let that lease go to pot. Another company took 1t over and 
drilled a well on 1t and there was never a dry hole found on that three 
hundred and twenty acres. It was the famous Teeter Pool. 1114 
Although 1t apparently wasn't in the cards for Truman to strike 1t 
rich in the 011 business, he lost no money 1n the transact1ono According 
to Morgan the five notes for $1,000 each were "soon paid off from the 
prof, ts accruing to the one th1 rd interest wh1 ch Harry had purchased. 1115 
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From War to Politics 
Truman had quit the Missouri National Guard in 1911, but when 
the United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, he went to 
work with MaJor John L. Miles to build a regiment out of a couple of 
undermanned artillery batteries. Truman did such a good Job rounding 
up men that he once remarked that he should be made sergeant for his 
work. Much to his surprise, he was chosen as a lieutenant instead. 
Later, ,n reflecting on his life, Truman once remarked, 11My whole 
political career is based on my war service and war assoc1ates. 1116 
Less obvious but equally sign1f1cant was his career before the war 
that made him the soldier he was. To say that he ran a regimental 
canteen, was a battalion adJutant, and a battery commander indicates 
he did his Job well. But even to say that he took a battery that was 
about to be broken up and made 1t into a functioning unit only 
scratches the surface about Truman and the war. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of the war as far as he was concerned was the great 
number of friends he made and the reputation he earned. Speaking of his 
command of Battery D, Truman once said, 11 I always tried to do every 
Job I got better than anybody had ever done 1 t before. 1117 
The Arm1st1ce found Truman and his men of Battery Don a rocky 
hillside east of Verdun. During the following five months, while 
awaiting orders to head home, many of the swift assoc1at1ons made during 
the war became f1 rmly f1 xed. It 1;1as a time when men could reflect. 
Few could forget how Truman spo~ted enemy batteries and conducted his 
own reconnaissance far ahead of his own troops Although the regimental 
commander refused to give Truman any medals for doing what he was 
supposed to do_, the regimental historian wrote 11 How many of the men of 
the infantry, d1gg1ng 1n on the open h1lls1des overhanging Charpentry 
17 
and Baulny, owe their lives to the alertness, in1t1at1ve and efficiency 
of Captain Truman and the quick responsiveness and trained efficiency 
of his men at the guns 11118 
Finally, on April 9, 1919, Truman and the other men of 129th 
Regiment boarded a German liner for the voyage back home. Gone from 
the United States barely a year, Truman was returning with dozens of 
friends and with experience some men never get. 11 I 1 ve always been 
sorry I did not get a university educat10n rn the regular way, 11 Truman 
said later. "But I got ,tin the Army the hard way--and 1t stuck. 1119 
When Truman was discharged from the service on May 6, 1919, he 
had no firm plans. "I didn't know what I wanted to do, 11 he said 
later. 11 I had $15,000 or $20,000 and eighty acres of land which I 
had inherited from my uncle. 1120 However, two things were apparently 
very clear to him; he was not returning to the farm, and he v1as going 
to marry Bess Wallace. 
After the wedding, which took place on June 28, 1919, Truman 1 s 
greatest concern was how he would support himself and Bess. His old 
011 company was still 1n existence, but after discussing the matter 
1tn th h1 s partner, Dave Morgan, it was agreed that the f1 rm should be 
dissolved. One morning 1n July, during a visit to Kansas C1ty, Truman 
happened to run into Eddie Jacobson, the former sergeant who had 
helped him manage the regimental canteen at Camp Doniphan. While 
they reflected on their hugh success with the canteen, Truman remarked, 
11 Maybe we ought to go into bus mess together, and have a partnership 
again 1121 After a brief discussion, Truman and Jacobson decided to 
open a men's furnishings store. Truman raised $20,000 by selling the 
stock and equipment of the Young farm, and with the money Jacobson 
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invested, they were able to open their doors for business on November 
29, 1919. 
The store Has well situated for business on the ground floor 
of the old Baltimore Hotel, across the street from the Muehlebach 
Hotel 1n downtown Kansas City. Times were good and they anticipated 
no difficulties in moving their $35,000 inventory. Jacobson told a 
reporter, "Twelfth Street was in its heyday and our war buddies and 
the Twelfth Street boys and girls were our customers ... We sold 
silk shirts at sixteen dollars. 1122 During the first year of operation 
they sold over $70,000 worth of goods. With their sights on even 
greater profits to come, they plowed their earnings back into stock. 
It was a hectic year, a six-day-a-week proposition that seldom allowed 
Truman to get home before m1dn1ght. 
During the second year of bus 1 ness, things turned sour. Shortly 
' 
after the Harding Adm1n1strat1on took office 1n March, 1921, farm prices 
began to slide. With less money 1n the pockets of the farmers, 1t 
wasn't long before the prices of goods began dropping, too. Truman 
and Jacobson had bought the1 r inventory when the pr, ces 1t1ere h1 gh, but 
now that pr, ces had dropped, they were forced to cut the, r prices until 
there was no profit margin. By early 1922, the inventory previously 
valued at $35,000 had dropped to a value of less than $10,000. Money 
was getting tight all over and people were getting scared. For the first 
time, creditors became curt in their demands for payment. Crisis was 
upon them. 
After borrowing money to pay off creditors and attempting to delay 
the rnev1table!I the day finally came when they could no longer continue. 
Their plight was not unusual, small businessmen all around them were 
going into bankruptcy to wipe out their debts However, neither 
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, Truman nor Jacobson was willing to accept the stigma of bankruptcy. 
Instead they returned their rema1n1ng stock to their creditors, who 
agreed to accept 1t if Truman and Jacobson would agree to pay the 
balance. Truman estimated his venture in the haberdashery business 
cost him $30,000. 
By February, 1925 the pressure of continuing debts was too much 
for Eddie Jacobson, and he filed a petition in bankruptcy. Lawyers 
advised Truman to do the same, but he refused and insisted upon paying 
off all debts incurred by him and Jacobson, although Jacobson was now 
free of them. After Jacobson went into bankruptcy he met Truman one 
day, and when Truman saw that his shirt and suit were frayed, he 
1ns1sted that Jacobson take the few dollars in his billfold and buy new 
clothes. In later years, Eddie Jacobson reimbursed Truman for half 
the debts he repaid. 
As for Truman's indebtedness, it became increas1ngly complex as the 
years went by. The Security State bank, where he had a $5,000 loan, had 
its assets taken over by the Continental National Bank. On April 30, 1929, 
the bank obtained a court JudgmenL against him amounting to $8,944.78. 
Also, the bank took over the 160-acre farm deeded as security. A few 
years later, when the Continental National Bank failed during the depression 
and Truman was 1n the Senate, he purchased his note, which was put up for 
$1,000, through his brother Vivian. Thus ended the long years of financial 
misery brought on by Truman's electing to do what he thought was right, 
23 rather than what was popular. 
Judge Truman 
During the time Truman stood behind the counter of his haberdashery 
surrounded by unsalable merchandise and no customers, he had ample time 
to evaluate and contemplate his future. Perhaps he noted that other 
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ex-soldiers were doing well in politics, or perhaps he was tired of 
trying to make it in business But whatever the reason, Truman had 
decided to enter politics 
In Jackson County, entering politics required more than Just 
making an announcement. If a man d1dn 1 t have the support of one of 
the political machines, he couldn 1 t get anywhere. Fortunately for 
Truman, one of his former m1l1tary acquaintances was Jim Pendergast. 
With the help of Truman 1 s friends and relatives, Mike Pendergast, Jim's 
father and head of the Pendergast machine 1n rural Jackson County, 
became convinced that Harry Truman was the right man to run for Judge 
for Eastern Jackson County. 
In June, 11 B1g Mike," as he was called, had a meeting of his Tenth 
Ward Democratic Club. The top political bosses from every township 
rn the county was on hand and the beer fl owed freely. After the 
routine business was over and the crowd settled down, Mike rapped on 
the table and said, "Now I'm gorng to tell you who you're going to 
support for county judge. It's Harry Truman. Harry Truman is a 
returned soldier, a captain 1 over there' with a fine record and whose 
men d1dn 1 t want to shoot him! 1124 
Truman faced stiff opposition 1n the Democratic primary, and 
indications were that his first race would be his last. Emmett 
Montgomery, who was the strongest of the oppos1t1on against Truman 
in the primary, tried to destroy him early in the campaign by showing 
that he had actively supported a Republican for county marshal 1n 1920. 
Contronted with the charge at a p1cn1c 1n Oak Grove, Truman responded· 
"You have heard that I voted for John Mil es for county 
marshal. I'll have to plead guilty to that charge, along 
with some five thousand ex-soldiers. I was closer to John 
Miles than a brother. I have seen him in places that made 
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hell look like a playground. I have seen him stick ~o his 
guns when Frenchmen were falling back. I have seen him 
hold the American line when only John Miles and his three 
batteries were between the Germans and a successful counter-
attack. He was of the r1ght stuff, and a man who wouldn't 
vote for his comrade under circumstances such as these 
would be untrue to his country. I know every 2gldier under-stands it. I have no apology to make for it. 11 
With the voting support of his friends and relatives and with John 
Miles preventing ballots from being stuffed, Truman won the primary 
and went on to defeat his Republican opponent. Thus, Harry Truman had 
attained the first goal of his political career. 
Truman had not Joined the Ku Klux Klan as some had suggested 
1n 1922. Although an organizer of the Klan 1mpl1ed that the Klan would 
be glad to support him as a member, apparently Truman felt the price 
was too high. When he was told, 11 You 1 ve got to promise us you won't 
give a Catholic a Job 1f you belong to us and we support you," Truman 
responded by saying, 11 I won I t agree to anything l 1 ke that. I had a 
Catholic battery in the war and 1f any of those boys need help I 1m 
going to give them a Job. 1126 Between 1921 and 1924, Klan membership 
went from 100,000 to 5,000,000a According to a popular Joke during 
the period, the Klan didn't Just haLe Catholics, Jews, and Negroes. 
They hated everybody. Again, Truman elected to do what was right 
instead of what was popular. 
By the time the 1924 election came around, Truman was no longer 
an unknown. He had done a good Job as Judge and many people knew it. 
In June, 1924, The Kansas City Star, never a partisan of the Pendergast 
machine, said, 11 the county court of which Truman was a member had in 
less ~han a full term 1 rectuced a def1c1t of $1,200,000, left by the 
plundering Bulger machine, approx1maLely one half and have 1n the 
county treasury besides a balance of $270~000. 11127 Truman \\Ion the 
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renom1nat1on handily. 
The Republicans, who also had a primary that spring, were down 
to the last day of filing without a candidate. Perplexed with having 
no candidate, Truman 1 s Republican friend, MaJor Miles, discussed the 
matter with another of Truman's Republican friends, Judge Bundschu, 
and they decided to file the name of one of Miles' deputies with the 
understanding that he would withdraw as soon as a better qualified 
candidate could be found. According to Bundschu he paid five dollars 
and filed for Henry Rummell wi~hout his knowing about 1t. Although 
Miles went to Rummell and suggested that he withdraw, Rummell had 
already been promised the support of Joe Shannon, head of the anti-
Pendergast Democrats, and the Ku Klux Klan, and was not about to withdraw. 
Shannon, the Klan, and the Republicans proved to be too much for Truman, 
and he lost by 867 votes. Harry Truman was again out of work. 
In 1925, Truman solved his employment problem when he found a 
Job selling memberships in the Kansas City Automobile Club. Within 
a year he was making more 'money than he had made as a c.ounty Judge. 
But there was another tide of events for Truman 1n 19259 It was 
the year he quit law school, started only the year beforeo And 1t was 
also the year his daughter Margaret, born the previous year, was to 
suffer from the flu, pneumonia, and rheumatic fever. Truman soon became 
tired of selling memberships 11 because it required too much travelrng. 1128 
Truman was provided a chance to get out of the selling business 
by Spencer Salisbury, a former war associate and member of a highly 
respected Independence fam1 ly Sal 1 sbury offered Truman an opportunity 
to become a banker without investing a dime. Without questioning why 
anyone was willing to give up a profitable bank for no cash, Truman, 
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Salisbury, and Arthur Metzger each signed a $10,000 promissory note and 
became ba~kers. About two months after taking over the bank, the reason 
for the unusual sale arrangement was discovered. While checking the 
bank's records, it was determined that the bank was nothing more than 
a "bl ind. 11 According to Spencer Salisbury, "It seems that Charles U. 
Becker, the Republican Secretary of the State of Missouri, wanted a bank 
where he could borrow money for his printing business. And that was it. 
All the bank's cash assets were the funds from state auto licenses that 
were deposited here. Becker and his friends put up notes that weren't 
worth a damn ... We didn't have a bank--we had a bank failure on our 
hands. 1129 Truman and his associates, although taking different routes, 
got out of the banking business without loss, but the depositors lost 
between $50,000 and $100,000. Again, Truman stayed w1th the matter 
until it was resolved 
At the same time Truman and his two associates were involved 1n 
the banking fiasco, they also became partners in a savings and loan 
business. This ven~ure proved considerably more successful, even with 
the sharp decline 1n home building that began 1n 1926. In the early days 
of the savings and loan business, Salisbury helped Truman become president 
of the National Old Trails Association, an organization dedicated to 
building national highways over the famous trails that shaped American 
history. This Job required Truman to do a lot of traveling as well as 
public speaking. As a speakerg Truman was described as having a weak 
voice and nervous mannerisms. But while he was obviously not a polished 
speaker, his lack of polish was viewed by some as making him appear 
() 
11 more human. 11 In short, the man was the message 
By mid-1926, as the Democratic pr1rnar1es approached, Truman had 
24 
set his sights on a new Job. He wanted to be county collector, a Job 
which paid $25,000 a year, but he knew that he would have to have the 
backing of Tom Pendergast, the boss of the Kansas City pol1t1cal machine 
After talking to 11 Big Tom 11 and receiving an emphatic 11 No, 11 Truman 
decided to run for presiding Judge, the Job for which Pendergast had 
promised his support. As the result of an agreement between Tom 
Pendergast and Joe Shannon, Truman had no opposition in the primary. 
With only the Republicans and the Klan against him, Truman won by 
16,000 votes. 
The question 1n the minds of many of Truman's backers concerned 
whether Truman could provide the hones~ and economic government he 
had promised and still satisfy Pendergast and Shannon. Truman hired 
a lot of Pendergast 1 s friends for key Jobs, as he had been instructed 
to do, but he f1 red them if they 11 d1 dn I t work 1 n the county 1 nterest. 11 
After several other moves, such as setting up an inspection and audit 
system to catch crooked contractors, the Pendergast operation went into 
an uproar. Accord, ng to Tom Evans, 11 They weren't accustomed to anyone 
acting on his own. Any day they expected Old Tom to squelch Harry. But 
he never lifted a f1nger. 1130 
By the time Truman f1n1shed his term of office, he had done a good 
Job and people knew it. The Kansas~ Times described him as being 
"extraordinarily honest," and said that there was 11 not a suspicion of 
graft rnvo 1 ved ,n h1 s road program 1131 When Truman ran for his second 
four-year term, he had several reasons to feel confident. He was well 
established and a Pendergast lieutenant Even after several attempts to 
d1scred1t him, rruman won the race by some 58,000 votes. 
During the following four years, Truman continued with h1s road 
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program and took on new ventures wiLh success. During this period, 
Kansas City experienced the effects of organized crime operating under 
the rule of a Pendergast lieutenant. Johnny Laz1a, known as the "Al 
Capone of Kansas Ci ty 11 was not concerned with Truman, who was busy in 
rural Jackson County building roads and courthouses. 
With the approach of 1934, Truman realized the traditional length 
of service for a presiding Judge was two terms and that he would have a 
maJor struggle to prevent being dumped by the Pendergast machine. 
Truman 1 s expectations of the future were expressed 1n a memo to himself, 
written a few days after h1 s f1 ft1 eth birthday ,n May, 1934: 11 I 
thought. that retirement 1n some m1no~ county office was all that 
was in store for me. 1132 
If one were to attempt to characterize Harry Truman's rhetorical 
development as of 1934, 1t would certainly have several dimensions. 
From a physical aspect Truman was less than inspiring. Although not a 
large man, he was often described as appearing smaller than he really 
was. He had a weak, high voice and nervous mannerismsa However, when 
one looks beyond how Truman appeared to how Truman actually was, there 
is an entirely different perspective of the person. Truman was a man 
who had gamed much credib1l1ty in the eyes of those who knew him The 
fact that he was supported by the Pendergast machine and managed to be 
his 11 own man 11 concerning his campaign promises attests to that. Truman 
was a man of the people. He understood their needs, he understood their 
values, and he talked their language. When he addressed an issue, he 
went straight to the point that was of interest to the people Concerning 
his road building program, Truman said consideration would be given 
11 only to practical needs--not pol1t1caL 11 Afterwards he said, 11 th1s 
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county plan was based on practical needs, it was carried out along 
practical lines, its effect will be for the practical benefit of 
every c1t1zen 11133 Truman made his rhetoric s imp 1 e to fo 11 ow, on the 
subJect, and about vital matters. 
Although one might conclude that Truman was not a polished 
speaker in 1934, few would say he was not persuasive. Perhaps those 
very qual1t1es that prevented him from being polished were the qualities 
that made him persuasive. As a politician addressing the people of 
Jackson County, Truman must have identified with their needs, their 
values, and their approach to matters. He was viewed by most as a man 
of character, and in the words of Aristotle, 11 hi s character may almost 
be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. 1134 
Senator Who? 
When Democratic Senator Bennett Clark made his proclamation 1n 
Washington that he would smash the Pendergast machine and name Missouri's 
next Senator, Tom Pendergast took it as a personal threat. Roscoe 
Conkling Patterson, a Republican, was the incumbent, but, with the New 
Deal riding high, the Democrat that won the primary was almost assured 
of beating him 1n the fall election. 
Pendergast wanted Jim Reed to run against Clark's announced 
candidate, Jacob L. 11 Tuck 11 Milligan, but after much stall mg and 
deliberation, Reed decided not to run. Pendergast even asked Joe 
Shannon to accept the nomination, but he had a safe seat in the House 
and had too much to lose by running. Next, Pendergast turned to James 
P. Aylward, Jackson County Democratic Chairman, but he refused the offer, 
tooo Pendergast was in a quandary. 
Why Pendergast decided to run Truman 1sn 1 t completely clear. 
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Perhaps he gave up winning and Just wanted to fill the ticket, or 
perhaps he thought Truman had an outside chance What does seem clear 
is that most observers didn't give Truman any chance at all. 11 1 don't 
think Truman's heavy enough for the Senate," Joe Shannon said, 11 1 can't 
imagine him there and I doubt if he can be elected. 1135 
Truman opened his campaign in July opposed not only by Milligan, 
but by another formidable opponent named John J. Cochran, who had been 
praised publicly by President Roosevelt. Not long after entering the 
race against Truman and Milligan, Cochran was voted one of the six most 
useful members of the House, by Capital correspondents. Undaunted by 
such formidable opposition, Truman went about his campaign in the usual 
Truman manner--taking nothing for granted and working as though his life 
depended on his winning. The Kansas City Times reported that in the 
hi story of M1 ssouri 11 there have been few such sp1 r, ted contests within 
a party. 11 Truman later described his efforts when he wrote that he 
11 went rnto sixty of Missouri 1 s one hundred and fourteen counties 11 and 
"made s1x to sixteen speeches a day. 1136 
As the returns started coming in, it seemed that Truman was 
going to finish Just as predicted. Votes outside Jackson County 
showed 234,580 for Cochran, 139,321 for Truman, and 138,702 for M1ll1gan. 
When the votes were counted for the Pendergast territory, Truman had won 
the pr, ma ry by 40,000 votes. The November general elect 10n found Truman 
a rather confident challenger. He spent a total of $785 campaigning against 
Patterson. To no one's surprise, Truman won by 262,000 votes. 
When Harry Truman went to Washington to embark on his new career, 
1n many ways he was like a fish out of water. There were things completely 
new to him in Washington and a few he didn't understand at all His lack 
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of grasp was reflected 1n his speech to the Kansas City Elks Club. 
The New York Times, on December 18, 1934, made the following comments 
about his speech rn an ed1 tori a 1 titled 11 Jus t a Farmer Boy. 11 ~vhi ch 
read· 
Judge Henry[sic] S. Truman, Senator-elect from M1ssour1, 
is not moved as yet by the splendors of Washington or the 
maJesty of the Senate. If the will of Tom Pendergast and 
the people has called him to the Senate, his heart 1s true 
to the rivers of the home country, the Kansas and the M1ssour1, 
819 Blue and Little Run. In his speech to his brother Elks 
and tillers of the s011 1n Kansas C1ty--whose agriculturalists 
gave him 135,000 of his fat maJority--he was 11 Just a farmer 
boy from Jackson County. 11 He wasn't going to make a splurge 
at Washington. He was going to 11 keep his feet on the ground. 11 37 That, he said in language highly indecorous for a sub-freshman. 
Harry Truman came to Washington viewed by most as being not the 
representative of the state, but the personal representative of one of the 
most corrupt political machines 1n the country. Many of his peers avoided 
him. Pat McCarran of Nevada once said he 11 never considered him a 
38 Senator. 11 Victor Messall, when first offered the Job of being 
Truman's secretary, said, 11 I didn't see any future ,nan association 
like that. Here was a guy--a punk--sent up by gangsters. I told 
myself I'd lose my reputation 1f I worked for h1m. 1139 
It took a while for the people 1n Washington to learn about 
the "rea 111 Harry Truman. By the t 1 me Truman brought h 1 s family to 
Washington and they were settled down, Truman asked Messall agarn 1:0 
serve as his aide. Messall recalled, 11 By now I realized that my 
original impression of him was all weL This was a man of real integrity 
and brains and no Pendergast or anyone else was going to push him around. 
Once you got to know him you knew he had something special 
to go to work for him. 1140 
So I agreed 
Truman found his speaking requirements as a Senator more torturous 
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than campa1gn1ng or talking before Jackson County folks Messall 
reca 11 s: 11 Every time he had to make a speech he I d te 11 me, 1 I can't do 
it. 111 Early in his Senatorial career a news crew was sent to record a 
speech. After many retakes and attempts to get Truman to speak up, 
the crew was ready to walk off. Messall persuaded them to make one 
more try. This time Truman did a passable job. As the crew was 
leaving, one of the sound men said in Truman's presence, "He ain't no 
Roosevelt. 1141 
Truman worked hard to master his new Job. He knew what his 
weaknesses were and spent much time improving himself. His daughter 
Margaret remembered that he "brought home mountains of work and long 
after I was rn bed he would be reading and studying his prob 1 ems. ,A2 
To keep abreast of happenings on a daily basis, he rose before 6:00 A.M. 
and read two Washington papers from cover to cover. He spent considerable 
time 1n the evenings at the Library of Congress. During the time 
Truman was involved 1n a subcommittee 1nvestigat1ng railroad finances, 
he had the Library of Congress send him fifty volumes concerning railroads, 
which he then read in detail. 
Although Truman's first term as Senator enabled him to demonstrate 
to many of his peers and superiors JUSL what Harry Truman was made of, it 
was also a time of frustration. It was a time that saw much of his work 
regarding leg1slat1on become bogged down by petty b1cker1ng. It was a 
time that saw Tom Pendergast develop such a mania for gambling on 
horse racing that he was forced to 11 indulge in massive fraud to sustain 
this destrUCLlVe compuls1on. 1143 And when Pendergast was sentenced to 
prison for income tax evasion, 1t must have been a time when,~ would 
have been easier for Truman to denounce his fallen supporter. But Truman 
30 
was not built of material that would allow him to give way to public 
pressure. Truman refused to do what was expedient. Instead, he 
stuck by old Tom, saying: 11 I 1m not a rat who deserts a srnkrng ship. 11 
Truman I s daughter rec a 11 s: 11 Never before or s i nee can I rec a 11 my 
father being so gloomy as he was rn those latter months of 1939, 
after Tom Pendergast went to prison. Nothing seemed to be going right. 1144 
With his transportation bill blocked in the Senate, Truman 
undoubtedly realized, as 1940 neared, that he had not made the usual 
political splash in his last year to remind voters that he had not 
been wasting his time or their money in Washington. This realization, 
teamed with the disarray of the Jackson County Democrats and Truman 1 s 
association with the fallen Tom Pendergast, left him with a rather dismal 
political outlook. 
Although Truman's first term in the Senate may not have provided 
him with the publicity he wanted and needed, it did result in a significant 
development rhetorically. As a result of his Senate experiences, he 
greatly increased his self-confidence and intellectual depth. Truman 
seemed inhibited or intimidated when he arrived 1n Washington, even 
cowed by suddenly being thrust into the presence of such esteemed men. 
He was reluctant to speak his mind. However, as he discovered that he 
was noL intellectually inferior and as he increased his understanding of 
leg1slat1ve matters, he began to speak with candor and convictionD 
Truman improved himself not only by constant reading, but by being a 
good listener. He found a source of new and meaningful ideas 1n his 
association with Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Louis D. 
Brande1sQ The elderly Justice took an 1mmed1ate liking to Truman and 
he became a regular visitor to Brande1s 1 weekly teas. After a few v1s1ts 
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to the Bran de is apa rtmen 1.., Truman rec a 11 ed that "the o 1 d man \~ou l d 
back me in a corner and pay no attention to anyone else while he 
talked transportat10n to me He was very much against the control 
of financial credn. 11 Truman 1 s first important speeches rn the Senate 
were described as being "distilled Brande1sese with a dash of Missouri 
for flavor. 1145 
When Truman returned to Missouri ,n January, 1940, to see what 
kind of support he could muster for his second senatorial campaign, he 
found his supporters few rn number and the prospects gloomy. Virtually 
everyone told him that 11 he didn 1 t have a chance of winnrng. 1146 There 
were many reasons for Harry Truman not to run for reelection and 
seemingly only one reason to run. Truman had little support, no money, 
and Tom Pendergast was in prison. Many people had already wri~ten 
Truman off as a serious contender. However:> the very fact that Truman 
was given no chance to win without the backing of Tom Pendergast made 
his not running impossible. Having been labeled as the Washington 
Ambassador of Pendergast, Truman responded: 11 ! can I t walk out on the 
charges that have been made against me. For my own self-respect, if 
nothing else, I must run .• .47 
When Truman began his campaign he found himself virtually without 
newspaper support and forced to cover the state making speeches. Although 
he may have gamed speaking experience rn the Senate, h1s del 1very was 
still far from pleasing to the ear. At his opening campaign speech, 
Truman I s good fr, end, Senator Sch~1e 11 enbach, introduced him by saying, 
11 I need not te 11 you that Ha try Truman is not an oratoro He can demonstrate 
that for h1mself. 11 Truman 1 s mother, who was sitting on the plat.form 
that day, said he was 11 such a bad speaker that 1t \~1as p1 ciful . 1.48 
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Truman's campaign speeches may not have been uttered in the 
manner and style of an orator, but no one can deny his ability to 
speak in meaningful terms to intended audienceso Concerning equal 
opportunity he said· 
I believe in the brotherhood of man, not merely the brother-
hood of white men but the brotherhood of all men before the 
law .•• In giving the Negro the rights which are theirs we 
are only act1ng 1n accord with our ideals of a true democracy . 
. . • The maJority of our Negro people find but cold comfort 
in shanties and tenements. Surely, as free men, they are 
entitled to something better than this ... It is our duty to 
see that the Negro 1n our locality have 4~creased opportunities to exercise their privilege as free men. 
And he also knew how to get the truth to the people concerning his 
opponents. When Truman learned that Governor Stark, his primary 
opponent, was requiring state employees to contribute to his campaign 
fund, he reported the matter to his friend Senator Guy GilletLe, 
Chairman of the Senate committee to investigate senatorial campaigns. 
According to Margaret Truman, the report of Senator Gille~te 1 s 
rnvesti gati on 11 was a Sunday punch to Lloyd Stark I s reformer image. 
'There 1s abundance of evidence to prove that many employees were 
indirectly coerced into contributing, although they may not be 1n 
sympathy with the candidacy of Governor Stark for the U.S. Senate, 1 
Senator Gillette sa1d. 1150 
As the primary campaign neared its end, Stark announced that 
Truman was operating his campaign with an immense slush fund provided 
by Tom Pendergast. Truman promptly wired Senator Gillette~ denying 
the charge and asking him to demand evidence from Stark. Since no 
proof was provided by Stark, on the eve of the primary Gillette issued 
the following statemenc 11 In all fa1 rness to Senator Truman and before 
the primary polls open, the public should know of the sending of this 
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telegram and the Governor's failure to acknowledge it. 1151 
As a result of Truman's persuasive strategy concerning not only 
himself but his opponents, and his keenly-timed tactics, he won the 
primary by some 7,000 votes and the general election by some 40,000 
votes. 
Back to Washington 
When Harry Truman returned to Washington after his reelection, 
he found the Capital buzzing with activity. As a result of the war in 
Europe, new Army camps were being established across the country and 
the initial wave of defense contracts were going out. Truman, like 
all of his fellow Senators, was busy trying to get as many defense 
contracts as he could for his home state. However, Truman soon found 
that the word had gone out, presumably from the White House, that 
certain Missouri politicians were to be ignored. 
At approximately the same time, Truman found the vast maJority 
of defense contracts going to a small portion of the country, he also 
discovered gross 1neff1c1ency and waste 1n defense spending. A friend 
wrote Truman about the appalling waste in the construction of Fort 
Leonard Wood near Rolla, Missouri. Other letters followed expressing 
' 
the same complaint and, after Truman was sworn in for the second time 
on January 3, 1941, he departed Washington for a personal inspection 
tour of the defense program. His tour lasted a month and covered some 
30,000 miles. 
On February 10, Truman told his fellow Senators of the staggering 
waste and mismanagement he had personally observed in the defense program 
In Senate Reso 1 ut1 on 7l, he recommended that a watchdog comm, ttee be 
created consisting of five senators to keep tabs on defense spending. 
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After some delay the Se~ate passed Truman 1 s resolution and voted him 
$10,000 to conduct the investigation. 
Truman realized that his biggest problem was to serve a positive 
purpose without causing embarrassment to the Roosevelt Administration. 
He began his investigations by going directly to camps and holding 
hearings on the spot. What the Truman committee found was truly 
incredible. By August, 1941, the committee had "documented $100 million 
of waste in the $1 billion camp-building program. 1152 Truman was subse-
quently given $85,000 to continue the work of the committee. 
The Truman Committee had a long nose and a big stick. Not only 
did 1t look into camp construction, but virtually all aspects of defense 
spending. When the Curtiss-Wright Corporation passed defective aircraft 
engines in one plant, the committee condemned four hundred engines. 
When it was discovered that the wingspread of the B-26 Martin Bomber 
was too short for stab1l1ty, Truman forced Martin to make the necessary 
changes in construction by threatening to stop future military purchases. 
Many Truman charges led to belated changes 1n the armed forces. 
General Brehon Somervell, whose Services of Supply caught much flak from 
the Truman Committee, later said that changes brought about as a result 
of the committee report saved the Government around $200,000,000. Clearly, 
the years Truman and his committee spent on overseeing defense spending 
saved the country billions of dollars. As Truman concluded: "the committee 
spent only $360,000 but saved the nation fifteen bill1on. 1153 
There are two interesting aspects of how Truman handled the 
investigations into defense spending in addition to h1s saving money. 
First, he determined the 1nformat1on about defense spending and waste 
by going direc~ly to the scene His first Senate report, as previously 
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mentioned, was based on a 30,000 mile fact-finding trip. His investiga-
tions of army camps were conducted on the site This technique of 
obtaining information says much about his understanding of human nature 
and persuasion. According to Aristotle: 11 The first thing to remember 
1s this. Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other 
subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subJect 
on which we are to speak and argue. 1154 And second, Truman 1 s willingness 
to threaten large corporations with terminating their defense contracts 
demonstrates very emphatically that he had attained the sort of pol1t1cal 
clout and persuasive maturity that comes with the development of self-
confidence. 
When colurnnis~suggested that a change had come over Truman in 
recent years, he replied: 11 1 haven 1 t changed. I am the same person I 
was five or ten years ago. 1155 It 1s probably true that Truman was 
essentially the same person as far as his personal conv1ct1ons and beliefs 
were concerned. However, the real change was in his realization that he 
had achieved stature and influence as a public figure operating at the 
national level. 
Eventhough Truman made s1gn1ficant improvements concerning h1s 
ability to function effectively within his role 1n the national government, 
there were other roles which made him uncomfortable. As a prominent 
Senator 1n much demand as a speaker, he still refused speech-making whenever 
possible. He was not an orator and he knew it. He was even offered six 
hundred dollars and expenses for making a series of lectures, but declined 
saying he wouldn't do it for any price. 56 
Pr1mar1ly because of Truman 1 s efforts 1n probing defense spending~ 
his name was being mentioned more and more as a possible vice-pres1dent1al 
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nominee. However, by the time the Democratic National Convention was 
held, Roosevelt still had not made his preference for a running mate known. 
Truman was receiving a good deal of pressure to seek the nomination 
actively, but he refused to act without an indication from Roosevelt 
that he was wanted on the ticket. After considerable delay, Roosevelt 
finally admitted that Harry Truman was his preference. 
Although Truman had little opportunity to persuade the convention 
members concerning his nomination, he certainly made maximum use of at 
least one. Actively entering the fight for nomination, Truman told 
reporters, 11 ! will win. I wouldn't be in the race 1f President Roosevelt 
57 didn't approve. 11 With this timely verbal stroke, he skillfully under-
mined the candidacy of Henry Wallace, the only person standing in his 
way of being nominated. Truman d1 d win, and he and Roosevel t went on to 
58 a resounding victory over Dewey and the Republicans. 
The President as Paradox 
Truman had been Vice-President a very short time when President 
Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, an event that thrust Truman into a 
per10d of unparalleled crisis and complexity. Mrs. Roosevelt obviously 
sensed the awesomeness of the task ahead for Truman even in her moment 
of gravest sorrow. When he arrived at the White House and asked Mrs. 
Roosevelt if there was anything he could do for her, she replied, "Is 
there any way we can help you? 1159 
As President, Truman found the straight-forward ma~ner developed 
as a farmer, artillery captain, county Judge, and senator often alien 
to his sophisticated audiences. Once, for example, after being scolded 
by Truman about Russia's v10latrng the Yalta Agreement, Molotov heatedly 
replied: 11 T have never been talked to like that rn my l1fe. 11 11 Carry 
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60 out your agreements and you 1110n I t get talked to l 1 ke that, 11 Truman 
countered. 
One of Truman 1 s strong points had always been his ab1l1ty to 
understand other people. Perhaps the antithesis of this quality--not 
understanding Harry Truman--was the quality most often found 1n his 
critics. For those who knew Truman, he was a man of unusual humility, 
loyalty, common sense, patriotism, and understanding. For those who 
dared not go beyond his apparent lack of sophistication, he appeared 
earthy~ unpolished, not an FDR, blunt, quick, and capable of making 
mistakes. Truman was, in a sense, a walking contradiction. The 
inconsistency between his innocuous outward appearance and his inner char-
acter and immense personal strength was unfathomable to many who 11 knev-t 
him. This 1ncons1stency 1s important 1n Truman 1 s rhetorical development 
because his outward appearance of vulnerability and weakness gave 
ammunition to Truman's opponents and l1kew1se affected his cred1b1l1ty 
as President. 
The Congress made the mistake of th1nk1ng Truman would be a 
middle-of-the-road, unassuming President, but they soon found him to 
be a man with a mind of his own and the courage to back 1t up. His 
failure to 11 f1t the moldll made him the butt of Jokes. 11 0ne bright 
saying went, 'to err is Truman•, another, 1 What would Truman do if 
he were al1ve? 111 And Truman had a falling-out with Congress on September 
6, 1945 that was to last the length of his Presidency. His opponents 
began to use every trick 1n the book to discredit h1mo Newspapers began 
to assess him as 11 bew1ldered, 11 a 11 1 ittle man 11 who 11 never seemed to 
understand. 1161 
Truman had only one criterion that he applied to the many dec1s1ons 
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that fell on him before and after the war-- 11 What 1s the right thing to 
do? 11 However, unlike the issues that confronted him before he became 
President, the difference between right and wrong became increasingly 
less evident in the complexities of adJusting from war to peace. 
More and more often he found himself in the middle of things, trying 
to satisfy contending forces and being personally blamed for any new 
problems that arose. On March 31, 1947, George Gallup made the following 
comments concerning Truman's ability and credibility determined from 
public opinion polls: 
His popularity 1n the early months of his term overshadowed 
even that of his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt ... Then 
as reconversion problems multiplied, Mr. Truman's popularity 
began to coast downward, at first gently, then rapidly, the 
downswing culminating 1n an Institute poll figure of 32 per-
cent in October 1946. There was a meat shortage, the future 
of O.P.A. was in confusion, the administration's foreign 
policy was also subJect to confusion owing to Henry A. Wallace's 
speech which seemingly contradicted the policies of Secretary 
of State Byrnes. Republicans were campaigning effectively on 
the "had enough" slogan. 
The president's popularity did not begin to turn noticeably 
upward until January 1947. Then 1t Jumped from 35 percent to 
48 percent. 
At the time of Gallup's report, Truman 1 s popularity had reached 
sixty percent. Gallup credited Truman's firm handling of John L. Lewis 
and the administration's proposed showdown with the Russians over the 
issue of Greece and Turkey as being the primary reasons for the upswing. 62 
S1m1larly, Truman put pr1nc1ple ahead of expediency and in fact 
demonstrated little regard for pol1t1cal timing. Dave Niles, 1n charge 
of handling minority and rel1g1ous matters for the Wh1 te House, said, 
11 Roosevel t did not bel ,eve rn getting too far rn front of the people. 
He had far greater patience than Truman and planned long-range educational 
programs ~o win popular support before he acted. When Truman saw a 
problem, he wanted 1t set-cled on the spot. 1163 
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Such was the case for example, in 1948. Without conferring with 
Congress10nal leaders, Truman sent to Congress a ten-point civil; rights 
message calling for strengthening of civil rights laws, a Federal 
law against lynching, and the protection of the right to vote. The 
result--f1fty-two Southern Congressmen said they would not support him 
for reelection. At a White House luncheon Mrs. Leonard Thomas, a 
national committeewoman from Alabama, told him, "I want to take a message 
back to the South. Can I tell them you're not ramming miscegenation 
down our throats? That you 1 re for all the people, not Just the North?" 
Before replying _he read the Bill of Rights to her. Then he said, 11 I 1 m 
everybody's President. I take back nothing of what I proposed and make 
no excuse for 1 t. 1164 
Truman's lack of concern for political timeliness almost cost him 
the 1948 election. In October, 1947, according to the Gallup Poil, 
fifty-five percent of the people approved of the way Truman was runnrng 
the nation. However, 1n April, 1948, after the 1ntroduct1on of the civil 
65 rights message in February, h1s popularity dropped th1rty-s1x percent. 
Perhaps 1t was again the fact that everyone had counted Truman out that 
prompted him to do that which he did best· get h1s message across to 
the people with the facts, and he made them stick. The innocuous 11 little 11 
man whose oratory had been described as 11 p1t1ful 11 pulled off another 
po11t1cal miracle. 
The Decline of Truman 1 s Publ1c Image 
In January, 1949, shortly after the election, Truman 1 s popularity 
66 was at sixty-nine percent according to the Gallup Poll. The year 1949 
also brought with it the 11 loss 11 of China to the Communists, the detonation 
of the first Soviet atomic device~ and the trials that eventually ended 1n 
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the conviction of Alger Hiss for perJury (for denying that he performed 
acts of espionage for the Soviet Union). These events were to a large 
extent responsible for creating a favorable climate for launching the 
era of Senator Joseph McCarthy. The Communist victory 1n China provided 
McCarthy with a potent issue, and the conviction of Hiss made subsequent 
attacks against the State Department and the Truman Administration credible 
to many. 67 
The charges made by Whittaker Chambers against Alger Hiss had not 
become an important issue in the campaign of 1948, but on December 15, 
Hiss was indicted for perJury. The statute of l1m1tat1ons prevented him 
from being charged with consp1ring to commit espionage. 
Hiss's first trial ended 1n a hung Jury in July, 1949. The 
second trial began some ten months later and ended with Hiss's conviction 
on January 21, 1950. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, speaking Just 
four days after the verd1 ct, told the press, 11 1 w111 not turn my back on 
Alger Hiss. 1168 According to Alan D. Harper rn The Politics of Loyalty. 
"That statement came to some as a perfect 1llumrnai:1on· the d1fficult1es 
the United States had experienced with the Soviet Union, the disaster in 
China, were not the result of errors 1n policy; that had been the 
consequence of treason rn high places. 1169 
Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin found the 
loyalty issue fertile ground for planting seeds of fear and susp1c1on~ 
On February 9, 1950, he began a weekend speaking tour that would take 
him from obscurity to national fame. Claiming as his authorny a letter 
wn tten nearly four years before by Secretary of State Byrnes, McCarthy 
stated that he had in his 11 hand a 11st of two hundred and f1ve [members of 
the State Department] that were known to the Secretary of State as being 
members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless a~e still working, 
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and shaping the policy of the State Department. 1170 
Being all too aware of the need to restore balance in considering 
mattersof loyalty and security programs, Truman convened a meeting at 
the Blair House on June 22, to discuss the possibility of establ1sh1ng 
a commission of d1stingu1shed c1tizens to 1nvest1gate the government 
employee loyalty program. At the end of the meeting, no decision had 
been reached other than to hold a subsequent meetingo That meeting 
never came because of the attack on South Korea Just three days later. 71 
Nevertheless, the loss of faith 1n the foreign policy arm of 
the government had already occurred, Truman was in trouble. From January, 
1949 to June, 1950, his popularity as determined by the Gallup Poll had 
dropped by some thirty-two percent. Gallup attributed the decline to 
11 rncreasrng tenseness of the world situation, the Communists gains rn 
Asia, 11 and 11 the constant criticism leveled at the State Department. 1172 
With the government 1 s credibility breeched, the Communists wasted little 
time seizing the advantage. 
Some understa~d1ng of the decline of Truman 1 s public image 
immediately prior to the invasion of South Korea is important for 
several reasons. First, it provides a basis for evaluating Truman's 
level of rhetorical development and motivation. Second, 1t provides 
an essential d1mens1on to the decision-making process with regard to 
Korea. Finally, and most important, 1c indicates the nature of the 
rhetorical environment w1th1n wn1ch Tru~an was forced to operate. 
Truman from the Inside ----------
Although much rnformat10n about an rnd1v1duai can be gamed from 
observing and studying his behavior, somer1mes the observer attributes 
incorrect causes to a given resporise. In trying to gain an add 1 t1onal 
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dimension into Truman's development as a rhetorical agent, it seems 
appropriate to look for recurrent themes or patterns in Truman's life. 
Perhaps the single most recurring theme was Truman's concern for right-
doing. This theme is vividly shown in the following portion of Truman's 
personal prayer which he wrote as a young man and carried with him always, 
a prayer that apparently provided him with comfort and consistency from 
high school to the White House: 
Oh! Almighty and everlasting God, creator of Heaven, Earth 
and the Universe: 
Help me to be, to think, to act what is right, because 1t is 
right; make me truthful, honest and honorable 1n all things; 
make me intellectually honest for the sake7§f right and honor and without thought of reward for me .•. 
The theme of right-doing was best reflected in Truman 1 s views on 
religion. 11 The most interesting thing to me, 11 he wrote, 11 1s over here 
1n the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters of the Gospel according to 
St. Matthew. 1174 Interestingly enough the f1 fth chapter of St. Matthew 
says rn part: 11 B l essed are they which are persecuted for righteousness 1 
sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye, when men 
shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil 
against you falsely, for my sake. . Great 1s your reward in heaven 
Truman was seldom if ever deterred from his pursuit of r1ght-do1ng, 
even 1n the face of strong public and pol1t1cal pressure. His study of 
history provided him with a perception of the present and 1ts relat1onsh1p 
to the future often beyond the grasp of his associates. Aristotle 
acknowledged the importance of understanding the past when he said· 11 The 
pol1t1cal speaker vnll also find the researches of the historian usefuL 1176 
Truman's understanding of the presert through h1 storic11l study and his 




In going over the history of various Presidents I find that 
there 1s nothing new. There never was a more thoroughly mis-
represented man than Thomas Jefferson. Of course, you are 
familiar with how they treated Andrew Jackson. Following him 
the two most thoroughly misrepresented were Grover Cleveland 
and Woodrow t~ilson. They almost hounded Cleveland to his grave. 
It is interesting to read the lies they published about him and 
Mrs. Cleveland. 
Lincoln, of course, was thoroughly misrepresented and it took 
fifty years to get at the truth. So I don't let these things 
bother me for the simple reason I know that I am trying to do 
the right thing and eventually the facts will come out. 
I'll probably be holding a conference with Saint Peter when 
that happens ... 
It is the business of the President to meet s, 7~ations as they arise and meet them in the public interest. 
Truman's sense of right-doing, his knowledge of the past, and his 
conviction that truth existed beyond the selfish motives of man constituted 
his 11 ,nwardness , 11 and inwardness that only those who knew him best ever 
recognized as ess€ntial principles upon which his life moved and his 
decisions were made. 
Summary 
In reviewing Truman 1 s development as a rhetorical agent, several 
salient characteristics emerge. His background as a farmer not only made 
Truman ident1f1able with farmers, but workers in general. He had stood 
1n their shoes, suffered their pain, and talked their language. As an 
officer 1n the artillery Truman learned the meaning of being responsible 
for others and administering to their needs. And his understanding of 
human nature, al ready acquired before en terrng the war, all 0 11Jed him to 
take a unit about to be dismantled and make it into an effective organization. 
His study of the Bible and history gave him a perception not only of 
right and wrong but of the natural and recurring relationship between man 
and events. He developed a unique understanding of relevance of the past 
to the present and the future that often carried tnm beyond the comprehens10n 
of his associates. Perhaps his perception of the recurring relationship 
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between man and events was the primary factor that susta med him rn the 
face of opposition. Once he determined a decision to be right, he 
stuck with 1t to the end. This was the nature and development of the 
man who made the long climb from fanner to pol1t1cian, from county 
Judge to President of the United States. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM AS A 
RHETORICAL EXIGENCE 
Introduction 
The Korean Conflict or "police action" as it was rather carelessly 
and unceremoniously dubbed, holds the special dist1nctio~ of being the 
first war of l 1m1ted obJect1ves in the history of the United States. 
tfagrng, defining, Justifying, and eliciting support for such a war 
created a need for rhetorical strategies and 11 god-terms 11 that \-'Jere 
altogether different from those of general war. With little by way of 
precedent to draw from, Truman and his advisors were impelled to devise 
a rhetoric of limited commitment to fit the realities of a war of 
l1m1ted obJect1ves. 
Both the dee, sion to 11 contarn 11 the war rn Korea and to 11 rnterpret 11 
this policy to t~e nation 1n a certain way can be descr1b2d as strategic 
choices for which Truman alone was responsible. This chapter focuses or 
the first o; these choices. The purpose here 1s to trace the development 
of the Korean problem until 1t comrranded attem:1on as an 11 imperfect10n 
ma,--ked by urgency, 111 and to show how Truman arialyzed and responded rn 
1t. Chapter IV will deal with Truman's second strategy choice: his 
d~fense of U. S part1cipat1on 1n The Korean War. 
Why Har Came !n Korea 
At the begrnn mg of World War II Korea domrnated by Japan, 
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primarily because of two wars at the turn of the century involving 
China, Japan, and Russia. Supremacy had been sought in Asia by both 
Japan and Russia, through domination of China. Both powers obviously 
saw Korea not only as a gateway to Manchuria, but a source of year-
round harbors. China's interest in Korea, however, centered around 
the barrier it made against the ambitions of Japan and Russia. 
During a conference held in 1845 between China and Japan, it 
was agreed that both nations would remove their troops from Korea 
and refrain from committing troops to that country in the future without 
informing the other side. This agreement only lasted until there was 
a domestic revolt in southern Korea 1n which the Korean ruler asked 
the Ch1nese for help. In response, the Chinese government sent 5,500 
troops and, in accordance with their agreement, notified Japan. Japan, 
either not trusting the Chinese motives or looking for an excuse to 
re-enter Korea, sent 8,000 troops. With the arrival of the two powers 
on the scene, the revolt quickly subsided leaving the two forces facing 
each other. F1ght1ng broke out and at the end of eight months, Japan 
had won a sweeping victory. A treaty was then made between the two 
countries by which China recognized the independence of Korea and Japan 
obtained Formosa. 
In 1904-5, some ten years later, Japan and Russia were at war over 
the Far East, and Manchuria and Korea in particular. Again the 
Japanese were v1ctor1ous and the two countries signed the Treaty of 
Portsmouth whereby Russia recognized Japan's predominant interests in 
Korea and agreed not to oppose any action Japan might take with regard 
to Korea. After the Portsmouth Conference 3 Japan assumed full control 
of Korea. 2 
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The interest of ~ner1cans 1n the Orient actually began prior 
to the birth of the United States. The first treaty between the 
United States and China was negotiated by Caleb Cushing, and signed 
in 1844. This treaty provided that the Unned States would be granted 
any concessions granted by Ch1na to any other powerv American influence 
was fe 1 t in a s 1 gm f1 cant way fo 11 owing the fa 11 of the Manchu Dynasty, 
when American and French forces, along with the British navy, put down 
the agrarian revolution and restored the Manchus to power. Although the 
revolution offered a real opportunrcy for healthy trade between China 
and the West, the American and British traders were more concerned with the 
immediate 1:hreat to the slave and opium trade. 
Contrnurng the1 r advances in the Orient, ,l.\i11eri cans opened Korea 
to Western penetration and exploitation 1n 1882, and in 1883 signed a 
treaty to aid Korea 1n case of unJust treatment by anoTher ~ounr.ry. 
However, when the King of Korea sought to send em1ssar1es to the treaty 
session rn Portsmouth following the Japan-Russia "Y_ar of 1904-5, fheodore 
Roosevelt sa, d rn effect that the session was 11 none of h1 s concern,. 113 
The subJect of Korea was a matter discussed at the Cairo Conferenci 
1n 1943. President Franklin Roosevelt, Cha1ng Ka1-shek, and Prime 
Minister Churchill all agreed that the enslaved people of Korea should 
eventually be free and independem:. Korea 1 s future was discussed again 
at Teheran, between Roosevelt and Stalin. Stalin agreed that Korea 
should become an independent nation, although 1r. might take as much as 
forty years before it would be ready. 
And ~area was again discussed when Roosevelt and Scal1n met 
privately during the Yalta conferenc2 in February, 1945. Roosevelt 
suggesr.ed there ought to be a three-po,'1/er trusteesh1 p vJi ch the Soviets) 
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the Chinese, and the United States represented. Stalin added that 
the British should be asked to Join the trusteeship arrangement. Stalin 
acknowledged this understanding after Truman became president when he 
told Harry Hopkins on May 28, 1945, that Russia was committed to the 
policy of a four-power trusteeship for Korea. 
Accord mg to Truman: "Korea was mentioned by Molotov but not 
discussed at my conferences with the Russian Premier and the British 
Prime Ministers at Potsdam. 11 Following Russia's entry into the 
Pacific war, it was agreed that "there should be a lrne of demarcation 
in the general area of Korea between American and Russian air and sea 
operations. There was no discussion of any zones for ground operations 
or for occupation, for 1t was not expected that either American or 
Savi et ground troops would enter Korea rn the 1mmed1 ate future. ,.4 
Although 1t 1s true that during the month of August, 1945, the 
same month the Russians entered the war 1n the Pacific, a line was 
drawn across Korea at the 38th parallel, this was done only to fac1l1tate 
the surrender of Japanese troops 1n the area. Russia would accept the 
surrender of troops north of the 1 me, and the Un1 ted States would accept 
the surrender of troops south of the line. 5 The State Department urged 
the surrender of Japanese forces 1n all of Korea be accepted by Americans, 
but the United States had no troops there and no shipping to land forces 
at more than a few locations in the southern part of the count<y. 6 
Soon after the Japanese surrender 1n Korea~ it became apparent 
that the Russians were treating the 38th parallel as a permanent d1v1d1ng 
line. No traffic was allowed across the line without permission, and 
since most of Korea I s meager industry was north of the 1 me and most of 
the good farming land to the south of 1t, the d1v1s1on compl1cated and 
disrupted the normal life of the nation. 
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After three months of occupation, General Hodge, the U. S. 
commander in Korea, reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the 
dual occupation of the country had imposed an impossible condition for 
establishing a sound economy and preparing Korea for future independence. 
In the south, the United States was being blamed for splitting the 
country, and resentment was growing toward all Americans in the area. 
Hodge reported that although the Koreans were not ready for independence 
by Occidental standards, their capacity for self-government would not 
greatly improve as long as the dual occupation existed. Hodge also 
reported that the interim solution of trusteeship was so strongly 
d1sl1ked that if it were imposed the Korean people would likely revolt. 
During a Foreign M1n1sters meeting 1n Moscow 1n December, 1945, 
Secretary Byrnes brought up the matter of Korea. On the second day of 
the meeting Molotov proposed on behalf of the Soviet government that a 
provisional government be set up 1n Korea to undertake all necessary 
measures for the development of the country. The proposal included 
that representatives of the United States and Russian commands in 
Korea meet w1th1n two weeks to consider urgent questions relating 
to both zones and work out arrangements for the establishment of a 
permanent co-ord1nat1on between the two commands 1n the adm1n1strat1ve-
econom1c sphere. With two minor changes, the Russian proposal was 
determined to be acceptable as presented. 
On January 16, 1946, as agreed to in Moscow, the American and 
Russian commanders met~ but almost 1mmed1ately 1t beca~e clear that 
no results would come from the talks It was the Russ1an 1 s pos1t1on 
that the conference was to work out minor accommodat1ons between the 
two zones. The U.S. position on the conference was that it should 
lead to the eventual Joining of the zones 
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The Joint Commission~ which was the key element of the Moscow 
agreement, began its work at Seoul on March 20, 1946. After almost 
two months of trying to resolve who the commission should and should 
not listen to, on May 8, 1t adJourned sine die without ever getting 
close to the problems of the nation. 
In January, 1947, General Hodge reported that Korea was near 
civil war, and economically the country was going from bad to worse. 
Black market act1v1ties were flourishing and conditions had brought 
about an almost complete breakdown of transportation. 
Based on reports by Generals MacArthur and Hodge, Truman approved 
Secretary Marshall's plan for another attempt to make the Joint 
Commission work. In April and May, the Secretary of State exchanged 
letters with Molotov concerning Korea, and there were some indications 
that the Russians were willing to modify their position. Arrangements 
were therefore made for the resumpt1 on of work by the counci 1 on 
May 21, 1n Seoul. 
After what appeared to be a good start, the commission soon 
became bogged down in the-same problems it had experienced before. 
The Russians insisted that those parties and ind1v1duals who had 
opposed the trusteeship prov1sions of the Moscow agreement were 1nel1gible 
for consultation. On this matter, the United States would not yield. 
Although the U.S. delegation continued to make efforts toward some 
Joint action, all proposals were unfavorably considered by the Russians. 
On August 26, 1947, 1t was proposed to the Russians that the 
four powers who were to constitute the trusteeship powers for Korea 
should meet in Washington on September 8 to determine a way to implement 
the Moscow agreement With this i~vitation, the United States submitted 
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a seven point proposal covering elections, the presence of UN observers, 
withdrawal of occupation forces, adoption of a Korean constitution, 
and UN assistance for public and private Korean agencies. 
The invitation and proposal were totally reJected by the Russians, 
who insisted the Moscow agreement provided for a Joint commission as 
the first step toward independence, and any other approach would be 
in v1olat1on of that agreement. Cons1der1ng the total lack of success 
with the Russians, President Truman instructed Secretary Marshall to 
place the issue before the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
which was about to convene. Marshall asked the UN to do what the 
United States and Russia had failed to do--unite Korea. 
On September 26, the Russians countered this move with a proposal 
that all occupation forces withdraw at the same time, sometime in 
early 1948. On the surface the offer was inviting. This was a time 
when U. S. commitments were many, forces were limited, and strong 
congressional pressure existed to reduce military spending further. 
With these things in mind, Truman instructed the State and Defense 
Departments to weigh commiLments to determine 1f the withdrawal proposed 
could be accomplished safely. 
After much study and cons1derat1on, 1t was determined that it 
would be most desirable to withdraw American occupation troops 
concurrently with the withdrawal of the Russian troops. In add1t1on, 
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who made a first-hand study 
of the situation 1n the summer of 1947, recommended that the Uo S. 
provide sufficient assistance to the South Koreans to enable them to have 
their own defense force before ftmer1can troops were withdrawn. 
To formalize the proposal for withdrawal, the United States 
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submitted a detailed plan to the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
Included 1n the plan was a proposal that elections be held 1n the two 
zones, under UN supervision, before March 31, 1948. This was to be 
the first step toward a national government. It was further proposed 
that the government should then build up its own security, organize 
its government, and arrange for the withdrawal of occupation troops. 
To supervise the elections, the United States suggested the creation 
of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. 
It was the Russian 1 s next move, and they charged that the 
United States had violaLed the Moscow agreement by taking the matter 
to the UN. They followed up the charge with a proposal to the UN 
that all occupation troops withdraw immediately. This resolution 
was defeated. The Soviet representatives then announced that if the 
UN commission were set up the Soviet Union would not take part in its 
work. The plan on Korea submitted by the United States was adopted 
by the General Assembly, with only the Soviet bloc abstaining. 
Accordingly, the United Nations Temporary Comm1ss1on on Korea was 
established and held its first meeting in Seoul on January 12, 1948. 
Although the Russian commander in North Korea would not allow the 
Commission to enter the northern zone, it was able to carry out its 
operations successfully in the south. In spite of the Communist 
efforts to sabotage the election 1n the south, four out of five el1g1ble 
Koreans registered to vote and over ninety percent of those registered 
did vote. 
On May 31, 1948, the National Assembly met for the first time and 
chose Mr. Syngman Rhee as chair~an. By July 12, the new const1tut1on 
had been completed, and by July 179 1t was promulgaced. Three days 
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later, the National Assembly elected Syngman Rhee President of the 
Republic of Korea And on August 15, 1948, cl1max1ng the change, 
i:he American m1 l 1 tary government came to an end and the Republ 1 c of 
Korea was formally proclaimed. 
In North Korea the Soviet authorities countered by establishing 
a 11 Democratic People's Republic of Korea 11 on September 9. Some ten days 
later, the Soviet Foreign Office advised the U.S. embassy in Moscow that 
all Soviet occupation forces would be out of Korea by the end of December 
1948. 
According to President Truman he was very much for withdrawing 
American troops from Korea, but knew the Russians had built up the 
North Korean army. It was estimated that South Korea could only survive 
as long as it received considerable aid from the United States. It was 
on this basis that the President approved, 1n the spring of 1948, a 
recommendation by the Security Council that the U.S. extend aid to 
the Korean government for tra1n1ng and equipping security forces and 
for providing extensive economic help. 
In early February, 1949, General MacArthur expressed his opinion 
to the Secretary of the Army that he favored prompt withdrawal of 
American troops from Korea. By March, MacArthur reported that the 
training and combat readiness of the Korean security forces had reached 
such a level that complete w1ihdrawal of American troops was Justified 
and would not adversely affect the Li~ S. position 1n the Pacific. At 
that time, the South Koreans had an army of approximately 65,000 men 
aided by an American advisory group of 500 officers and men. By June 29, 
1949, all U. S. troops, except for the advisory group left Korea. 7 
The pen od fo 11 owing the 1t11 thdrawa 1 of American and Russ 1 an troops 
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was an uneasy time for Korea. North Korea proceeded to harass the South 
with border raids and disturbances, and propaganda campaigns. The 
northern regime~ headed by Kim Il Sung, became so bold and hostile 
that it sent a letter to the United Nations announcing its intention 
to unite Korea by force. 8 
Although intelligence reports from Korea 1n the spring of 1950 
indicated a continued build up of North Korean forces and continuing 
guerrilla raids into the south, there was no indication as to whether 
an attack was certain or when 1t was likely to happen. According 
to President Truman this situation 11 did not apply alone to Korea ... There 
were any number of other spots 1n the world where the Russians had the 
capability to attack. 119 
Little did the United States know that these limited attacks from 
10 the north foreshadowed the invasion of the Republic of Korea. 
The Anatomy of~ Decision 
Saturday, June 24, 1950 was not a time when America's top fore1gn-
pol1cy men were eagerly awaiting the newest development on the 1nternat1onal 
scene. The President was 1n Independence, M1ssour1, enJoying a weekend 
with h1 s family. The Secretary of State was at h1 s farm rn Sandy Spn ng, 
Maryl and. The United States Representat1 ve to the United Nat, ons, Warren 
Austin, was leisurely attending to h1s apple orchard near Burlington, 
Vermont. And Austin's deputy, Ernest Gross, was involved \ii/1th h1s teen-aged 
daughter 1 s party, which included some twenty of her girl friends, rn the cool 
of their Manhasset, Long Island home 
That evening W. Bradley Connors, the Officer 1n Charge of Public 
Affairs for the State Oepartment 1 s Far Eastern Bureau, was relaxing inth his 
family 1n their Washington apartment. Shortly after 8:00 P.M., Connors 
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received a telephone call from Donald Gonzales of the United Press, 
asking if the State Department could confirm reports received by UP 
from their man in Korea indicating a large-scale North Korean attack on 
South Korea (the Republic of Korea). Connors, having no such information 
at the time, tried to call the American Embassy in Seoul, the capital 
of the Republic of Korea, but it was early Sunday morning there and the 
overseas circuits to Korea were closed. Connors then rushed to the 
State Department and found an official cable from John J. Muccio, the 
American Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, which said· "North Korean 
forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several places this 
morning ... It would appear from the nature of the attack and the 
manner in which 1t was launched that 1t constitutes an all-out offensive 
11 ag a ms t the Re pub 11 c of Korea. 11 
A little after ten o'clock that evening, while the Trumans were 
sitting in the library of their home in Independence, Missouri, the 
phone rang. The call was from Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State. 
11 Mr. Pres1dent, 11 he said, 11 ! have very serious news. The North Koreans 
have invaded South Korea. 1112 
The President's first reaction was to get back to Washington 
1rnmediately, but after learning that much of the details concerning 
Korea were not yet ava1lable, Acheson persuaded him to remain 111 
Independence. Acheson advised the President that he would call as 
soon as other reports made the situation more clear. He suggested to 
the President rn the meantime, thai: the United Nations Security Council 
should b2 asked to hold a meeting at once and declare that an act of 
aggression had been committed against the Republic of Korea. The 
President agreed with h1s recommendation. 
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Acheson's next call came at around eleven-thirty the following 
morning, Just as the Trumans were about to sit dm-m to an early Sunday 
dinner. In his conversation with the President, Acheson reported that 
the United Nations Security Council had been called into emergency 
session, and that recent reports from Korea 1nd1cated an all-out 
1nvas1on was under way. He stated that the Security Council would 
probably call for a cease-fire, but 1t was his view that the North Koreans 
would completely disregard the UN request, Just as they had done in 
the past. As Truman began to create a clear picture in his mind of the 
situation, it became obvious to him that some decision would have to be 
made at once concern1ng the degree of support the United States was 
willing to extend to the Republic of Korea. The President instructed 
Acheson to get together with the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of 
Staff and start working on their recommendations. Truman then advised 
Acheson that he was returning to Washington at once. 
Once Truman made his decision to return to Washington, he wasted 
no time. He advised the crew of the presidential plane Independence 
that he wanted to depart as soon as possible, and 1n less than an hour, 
the plane was ready. The President's departure was so rapid that two 
of his aides were left behind. 
Truman departed Kansas C1ty Municipal Airport at two o'clock, and 
the flight back to Washington took Just over three hours. According 
to Truman's account of the flight, i~ gave him an opportunity to think 
about the implications of the North Korean 1 s actions. He recalled tha~ 
this was ~ot the first time a strong nation had invaded a weak nation, 
ano he remembered 11 how each time the democracies failed to act it had 
encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. 1113 Truman f'el t that, 
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"Communism was acting in Korea Just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the 
14 Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier.a' 
The significance of th1s event must have weighed heavily on 
Truman's mind. Being a devoted student of history, it was his belief 
that the proper response to this s1tuat1on could be found 1n lessons 
of the past. And he must have realized that his handling of this 
problem was certain to have profound consequences. 
The situation in Korea during the past year had been far from 
uneventful. The North Koreans had made numerous raids into the South, 
sometimes with as many as 1,500 men. However, Korea was certainly not the 
only spot 1n the world where trouble was likely to come. At the time of 
the Korean rnvas ion, 1 arge Sul gar, an and Ruman, an arm, es were massed on the 
border of Yugoslavia, which had broken with Stalin the previous year and 
asked for support from the Un1ted States. A large Soviet garrison was stationed 
in East Germany. And powerful Russian forces located Just across the border 
were threatening Iran and Turkey. Truman feared that the Korean inc1dent 
15 might well be "the opening round of World ~Jar III. 11 
Of vital concern to President Truman was the status of the United 
Nations, which, ,n two days., was to celebrate its fifth birthday. 11 It was 
also clear to me, 11 Truman said, 11 that the foundations and the principles of 
the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could 
be stopped. 1116 Even before the presidential plane landed rn t,Jashrngton, 
Truman knew of the passage of the UN resolution denouncing North Korea 1 s act 
of aggression. When the Security Council assembled dt 2 20 P.M. Sunday, one 
chair Has glaringly vacant It was the chair of the Soviet representative who 
had been boycotting the council for five months because of its refusal to 
replace the Nationalist Chinese delegation w1th a representative of Red China. 
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With the Russian representative missing, the resolution denouncing North 
Korea's aggression against the South was adopted by a vote of nine to 
nothing. 17 This meant that the prestige and authority of the United 
Na t1 ans "was on the l 1 ne. 1118 
When Truman landed 1n Washington, Secretary of State Acheson was 
waiting at the airport, as was Secretary of Defense Johnson. The group 
hurried to Bla1r House, where on Truman's orders an emergency dinner 
conference had been called. They were joined by the three Service 
Secretaries~ the Joint Chiefs of Staff, top representatives of the 
State Department, and Ambassador-at-Large Ph1l1p Jessup. Since 1t was 
already late, everyone went at once to the drnrng room for dinner. 
Truman instructed the group that no discussion would take place until 
dinner was served and the Blair House staff had withdrawn. 
At the beg1nn1ng of the conference, Dean Acheson was called on by 
Truman to provide the group with a detailed picture of the situation 1n 
Korea. In response, Acheson began by reading the first report received 
by the Stai:e Department from the U.S. Ambassador in Seoul, Korea, the 
preceding evening: 
According to Korean army reports which partly confirmed by 
KMAG field advisor reports North Korean forces invaded ROK 
territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated 
about 4 A.M. OngJ1n blasted by North Korean artillery fire. 
About 6 A.M. North Korean infantry commenced crossing parallel 
1n Ongj1n area, Kaesong area, Chunchon area and amph1b1ous landing 
was reportedly made south of Kangung on east coast. Kaesong 
was reportedly captured at 9 A.M., with some 10 NorLh Korean 
tanks part1cipat1ng 1n operation. North Korean forces, spear-
headed by tanks, reportedly closing 1n on Chunchon. Details 
of fighting 1n Kangnung are unclear, although 1t seems North 
Korean forces have cut highway Am conferring with KMAG 
adv1sors and Korean officials this morning re situation. 
It would appear from nature of attack and manner 1n which 




There were add1t1onal messages from Ambassador Muccio, but all 
confirmed that a full-fledged attack was underway. The North Koreans 
had even been so bold as to broadcast a proclamation that was essentially 
a declaration of war. 
Acheson then presented the foll owrng recommendat1 ans wh1 ch the 
State and Defense Departments had prepared: 
1. Americans--1nclud1ng dependents of the M1l1tary Mission--should 
be evacuated; to accomplish evacuation, K1mpo and other airports should be 
kept open. In doing this, MacArthur should keep his air forces south of 
the 38th parallel. 
2. MacArthur should be instructed to provide ammunition and supplies 
to the Korean army. 
3. The Seventh Fleet should be ordered from Cavite to the Formosa 
SLrait to prevent the conflict from spreading to that area. The United 
States should make a statement to the effect that the Seventh Fleet would 
repel any attack on Formosa and that no attacks should be made from 
Formosa on the mainland. 
After hearing these recommendat10ns, Truman asked each person 
1n turn to express his agreement or disagreement and his personal views. 
From this d1scuss1on, two very apparent attitudes emerged. One, according 
to Truman, was the 11 complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of 
everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be 
done. 1120 The Navy and the Air Force thought air and naval aid might be 
suff1c1ent, but General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, felt that 
if the Korean army was really broken, ground forces would be required. 21 
Throughout the conference, the President continued his usual 
practice of l1sten1ng to the op1n1ons of his advisers before expressing 
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his own. It soon became obvious, however, that Truman's thinking on 
the plane to Washington had carried him beyond that of his advisers. 
While his advisers had obviously become bogged 1n details, Truman had 
been looking at the situation in a much broader context. Although 
each adviser was given the opportunity to express his views, Truman 
was the obvious leader. Everyone knew when the talking was over it 
would be up to the Pres1dent to make the decisions. Truman was grim 
and decisive in his manner and his thinking. He soon made his attitude 
perfectly clear that past policy was, indeed, past. The time had come 
to respond with boldness. Truman emphasized that the world-wide 
Communist threat was getting out of hand, and the situation in the 
Far East was deteriorating to the point where the national security 
of the United States, the future effectiveness of the UN, and the 
ab1l1ty to avoid World War III were gravely endangered 22 
Truman then directed that orders be issued putting Acheson's three 
recommendations 1nto immediate effect. Although the quest1on of using 
American ground forces was ra1sed at the conference, no decision was 
made. Truman decided that the only way to settle the momentous question 
was to get the facts. He told General Collins to have MacArthur send 
a survey party to South Korea immediately. He also ordered the preparation 
of orders for 80,000 men on duty 1n Japan, so they could move swiftly 1f 
MacArthur's survey party determined the only way to stop the Communist 
thrust was by introducing American combat troops Truman o~viously 
realized that once American combat troops were committed, all lesser 
options were gone. And being a student of history he must have realized 
that a cowmitment of this type, once made, tends only to increase. 
It had been less than thirty hours since the members of the 
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Truman Adm1n1stration first received reports of the attack in Korea, 
and little more than twelve hours since 1t was determrned that the 
attack was a serious aggression. Rarely had any government reacted so 
positively and swiftly to a crisis thousands of miles away. 23 
Options are Reduced 
On Monday, June 27, reports from the battlefield began to sound 
progressively worse, and one of the messages that arrived was from 
Syngman Rhee asking for help· 
Beginning in early morning 25 June, North Korean Communist 
Army began armed aggression against South. Your Excellency 
and Congress of US already aware of fact that our people, 
anticipating incident such as today's established strong 
national defense force in order to secure bulwark of democracy 
in the east and to render service to world peace. We again 
thank you for your indispensable aid in liberating us and in 
establishing our Republic. As we face this national crisis, 
putting up brave fight, we appeal for your increasing support 
and ask that you at the same time extend effective and timely 24 aid in order to prevent this act of destruction of world peace. 
With the situation becoming more and more alarming, Truman called 
another emergency meeting at Blair House for Monday night. MacArthur 1 s 
latest message provided no basis for optimism. It said rn part: "South 
Korean units unable to resist determined Northern offensive. Contributory 
factor exclusive enemy possession of tanks and fighter planes . Our 
estimate is that a complete collapse 1s 1mmrnent. 1125 Enemy tanks were 
outside Seoul, the United States Air Force was already f1ght1ng over Korea, 
and in the past twenty-four hours three Russ1an-buih Yak aircraft had been 
shot down during an attempt to strafe a Dani sh sh1 p evacuating Amen can 
dependents from Inchon. 26 Secretary of State Acheson again presented the 
Joint recommendat1ons of the State and Defense Oepart~ents. The main 
proposal was that the United States Navy and Air Force should be ordered 
to provide cover and support for the South Korean armies. Acheson repeated 
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a previous recommendation that the Seventh Fleet should neutralize the 
island of Formosa He added that the United Nations Security Council 
would meet the following day and that the United States would seek 
a resolution calling on members of the UN to give armed support to South 
Korea. During the ensuing discussion, no one raised any significant 
obJect1ons to the proposals. Truman approved the recommendations on 
the spot, to include strengthening United States forces in the Philippines 
and increasing aid to the French in Inda-China. The conference ended 
forty minutes after it began. 27 
Truman was still hoping to avoid the use of American ground troops 
in Korea. He hoped that the additional air and naval support might boost 
the fighting spirit of the battered South Korean army and stall the 
North Korean advance sufficiently to permit the South Koreans to regroup. 
Truman, too, needed a chance to regroup, since his next task was to persuade 
Congress to support his decisions. When the conference was over and his 
advisers departed, Truman told George Elsey and Charles Murphy to round 
up a meeting of congressional leaders for the following morning. 28 
Sunday and Monday had left many observers with the feeling that 
another Munich was in the offing. In Washington and around the world, 
diplomats, politicians, and average citizens were anxiously waiting to 
see what the United States was going to do about Korea. One Washington 
ambassador cabled his government saying: "The time has come when Uncle 
Sam must put up or shut up and my guess is he will do neither. 1129 
At 11·30 A.M., Tuesday, Truman met with fifteen congressional 
leaders 1n the Cabinet Room. After the President shook hands with each 
of them, Dean Acheson b~1efed them on what was happening 1n Korea and 
what had already been done. He pointed out that 1t was vital for the 
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United States ~o adopt a firm stand because the South Korean forces 
were weakening fast; moreover, the leadership of many Western European 
nations seemed to be 1n a state of panic as they watched to see if the 
United States would act or not. During Acheson's br1ef1ng, he failed 
to mention the role of the United States in the UN. Truman, however, 
noted this as the most important element of the situation. After the 
President read the statement he was going to release to the press after 
the meeting, he added some very s 1 gn, f1 cant remarks. He stated that the 
act was obviously inspired by the Soviet Union, and, if the United 
States let Korea down, the Soviets would swallow one piece of Asia after 
another. Truman was convinced that the situation 1n Korea had long-range 
implications and 11 If Asia went, the Near East would collapse and Europe 
would rnev1tably follow. 1130 
After the congress1onal leaders posed several concerned questions, 
and had received rather candid answers, Senator Tom Connally summed up 
congressional opinion when he said that it was apparent that this was 
"the clearest test case that the United Nat10ns has ever, ever facedp 
If the United Nations is ever going to do anything, this 1s the time, 
and if the United Nations cannot bring the cr1s1s in Korea to an end, 
then we might Just as well wash up the United Nations and forget it. 1131 
To this Truman nodded and vowed he was going to make absolutely certain 
that everyLh,ng the United States did rn Korea would be cons1 stent v-11 th 
the decision made by the UN Security Council. 
The Secretary of State then turned to a d1scuss1on of the role 
of the Soviet Union in regard to Korea. He pointed out that the 
President had specifically used the word Communism instead of Russia 
1n his press statement to leave che door open for the Soviet Union to 
67 
back down without losing too much prestige. And continuing in this 
vein, he asked the members of Congress not to condemn the Russians 
specifically for the Korean crisis. 32 
On Tuesday morning, June 27, rumor began to spread around 
Washington that the President would announce the pledge of American 
arms to the defense of South Korea. At 12·30 P.M., the official state-
ment was released. The reaction to the President's decision was 
described by the Christian Science Monitor's Joseph C. Harsch 1n 
the following terms: 
I have lived and worked in and out of this city for 20 years. 
Never before in that time have I felt such a sense of relief 
and unity pass through th1s city. 
The most curious thing about the affair was the June 27 
gloom from the belief that the administration would miss the 
boat and do something idle or specious. The dec1s1on to act 
already had been taken, yet almost everyone was assuming there 
would be no action. When it came there was a sense first of 
astonishment and then of relief. Mr. Truman obviously did 
much more than he was expected to do, and almost exactly what 
most ind1v1duals seemed to wish he would do. I have never 
seen such a large part of Washington so nearly satisfied with 
a dec1s1on of the government.33 
When the President 1 s statement was read in the House of 
Representatives, the whole chamber rose cheering except for Vito 
Marcantonio of New York, a long time fellow traveler of the Communist 
Party. 
After the statement had been read, a few Republicans asked 
irritably if the President had taken upon himself the power to 
declare war. While criticisms were being made and answers attempted, 
Senator William Knowland of Cal1forn1a, a rising figure in the Taft 
group~ interrupted to say 11 I believe that rn the very 1mporta1n: 
steps the President of the United States has taken to uphold the 
hands of the United Nations and the free peoples of the world, he 
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should have the overHhelmrng support of all Amen cans regardless of 
their party affil1ation. 1134 With this, both sides of the Senate broke 
into a loud sustained applause. 
That night at 10:45 P.M., the United Nations Security Council 
again met, with the Russians absent, and passed another resolution 
calling for member nations to 11 render such assistance to the Republic 
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore 
international peace and security to the area. 1135 
Wednesday was a day for good news. Averell Harriman, Just 
back from Europe, told Truman of his firsthand knowledge of the feeling 
of relief that swept through Europe's capitals when it was learned that 
the United States was taking a firm stand in Korea. Encouraging news 
al so came from Ambassador Muccio in Seoul, who sent the fo 1101.,111 ng 
message: 
Situation had deteriorated so rapidly had not President's 
decision plus arrival General Church party [head of MacArthur's 
survey team] become known here 1t 1s doubtful any organized 
Korean resistance would have continued through night. Combat 
aid decision plus Church's order have had great morale effect. 
Forthcoming air strikes hoped demoralize en3~y, make possible reform Korean army south bank of Han River. 
Telegrams and letters flooded the White House running ten-to-one 
1n favor of the President's action Truman was especially pleased to 
receive a wire from Thomas Dewey, his 1948 presidential opponent, 
which read· 11 I wholeheartedly agree with and support the difficult 
dec1s10n you have made. 1137 
The Dec1sion to F1ght 
Even with the United Nations backing tbe President and i:he 
American people cheering his decisions!) n would have been complei:ely 
out of character for the oppos1t1on party not to be opposing something 
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or someone. It wasn't until Wednesday that Robert A. Taft, Mr. Republican, 
took the Senate floor. Taft accused the Truman Adm1n1strat1on of 1nv1t1ng 
the North Korean attack by perm1tt1ng Korea to remain divided. He 
singled out for special criticism a speech given by the Secretary of 
State earlier in 1950, in which he said that Korea lay outside the 
United States• perimeter of defense 1n the Pacific. It was obvious 
from Taft's speech that his primary target was not the decisions of 
the Truman Administration, but the Secretary of State. 11 The President's 
statement of policy [on Tuesday] represents a complete change in the 
programs and pol1c1es heretofore proclaimed by the Admrn1strat10n, 11 said 
Taft, and 11 any Secretary of State who has been so reversed by his 
superiors and whose policies have precipitated the danger of war, had 
better resign or let someone else administer the program to which he 
38 was, and perhaps still is, so v10lently opposed." 
Although Taft questioned the President's authority to engage 
the nation in armed intervention and attacked the Secretary of State, 
this was only one phase of his speech. Throughout the remainder of his 
speech, he made it clear that he approved of the general policies out-
lined 1n the President's statement. The tenor of Taft's speech was so 
unusually 11 pro-admrn1stration 11 that Charles Ross, Truman's press 
sec re ta ry, responded with: 11 My God! Bob Taft has Joined the UN and 
the U. S. 1139 
On Thursday, the news from the Korean battlefield turned sour_ 
General MacArthur's headquarters reported to the Pentagon that the 
South Korean casualties 1,,1ere approximately fifty percent and that 
there was little hope of forming a line at the Han River, south of 
Seoul. Then came a telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. 
70 
The message was 1n response to Truman's order on June 27 to ask the 
Russi an government to 11 use 1 ts rnfl uence with the North Korean 
authorities to withdraw their invading forces immed1ately. 1140 
Soviet Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko read the grim reply. 
l. In accordance w1 th facts ven f1 ed by the Soviet Government, 
the events taking place 1n Korea were provoked by an attack of 
forces from the South Korean author1t1es on the border regions 
of North Korea. Therefore the respons1b1lity for these events 
rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those who 
stand behind their back. 
2. As 1s known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops 
from Korea earlier than the Government of the United States 
and thereby confirmed its trad1t1onal principle of non1nter41 ference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea. 
By lat:e morning, Secretary of Defense Johnson was on the phone to the 
White House, urging another high-level conference, which Truman set 
for 5·00 P.M. 
At 4·00 P.M., the President held his first press conference since 
the Korean attack. The reporters had many questions about Korea, but 
Truman obviously was unwilling to go on record prematurely concerning 
most of them. He did, however, say that the United States was not at 
war and agreed with the descr1pt1on given the U.S. action by one reporter 
who called ,t 11 a police action under the United Nat1ons. 1142 
After the press conference, the President went to the White 
House for the five o'clock meeting with his advisers. The group 
consisted of the men who had attended the Sunday and Monday meetings 
and some additions~ including the Republican advisor to the State 
Department, John Foster Dulles :i \ 11ho had recently returned from Korea, 
and Averell Harriman, chief of American economic activities in Europe, 
who had Just returned from Paris the day before. The conference opened 
with the Secrei:ary of State giving a review of the imlitary situation 
in Korea and pointing out specifically that American naval and air a1d 
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vvere not turn mg the ti de of battle as had been hoped. Secretary of 
Defense Johnson then read a proposed directive prepared earlier by 
the Defense Department and concurred in by the State Department, 
\vh1 ch \'JOul d author, ze General MacArthur to use Amer, can serv1 ce troops 
(non-combat) throughout Korea. These service troops were mostly 
signal corps and transportation units. The proposed directive 
stipulated the use of American combat troops to protect the port and 
airfield at Pusan. American ships and planes were allowed to expand 
their operations to include military targets in North Korea. American 
combat troops, however, were not authorized for use 1n the combat area, 
some two hundred miles north of Pusan. 
The suggestion to use American ground troops anywhere 1n Korea 
caused the President to hesitate. During the ensuing discussion the 
Secretary of Defense contr1 buted to the group the Sov1 et reply to the 
American request that Russia use its influence to bring about a cease 
fire. The primary significance of the message was not, according to 
Acheson, the fact that Russia had refused to help, but that the message 
suggested no plan for direct Russian military intervention. This 
evaluation helped remove some of the President's reluctance to use 
American ground troops and the strong unified urging by his military 
advisers removed the rest. 
That evening Acheson returned to the White House with a message 
from Chiang Ka1-shek, offering up to 33,000 Chinese Nat1onal1st troopso 
Chiang advised, however, that he vvould require American naval and air 
units to transport and supply his troops. The Pres1de~t•s 1n1tial 
response was to accept the offer, since 1t provided an option that 
would reduce the need for Amer, can troops. Acheson \11as opposed to 
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the idea. He argued that the Chinese Nationalist troops would require 
considerable re-equipping before they could be used 1n combat, and 
that it didn't make sense for the United States to protect Formosa 
and send Nationalist troops to fight elsewhere. Truman still had 
some reservations about the matter and asked Acheson to bring 1t 
up again at the Friday-morning conference. 43 
According to Truman, he was still inclined to accept the 
Chinese offer the following morning. When Frank Pace, the Secretary 
of the Army, called at 5:00 A.M., Truman was already up. Pace told 
the President that he had received information from General MacArthur, 
who had Just completed a trip to the Korean front line, that he was 
convinced that only American ground units could stop the North Korean 
advance. MacArthur had asked for permission to commit one regimental 
combat team immediately and to build up to two divisions as rapidly 
as possible. The President told Pace to inform MacArthur immediately 
that the use of the regimental combat team was approved. On the question 
of two divisions, the President promised an answer in a few hours. 
AfLer hearing the seven o'clock briefing from the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff's representative, Truman called the Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretary of the Army and told them to be prepared to discuss at an 
eight-thirty meeting MacArthur's request for authority to commit the two 
divisions and the offer of troops by Chiang Ka1-shek. 
At the conference, Truman raised the question whether it would be 
wise to accept the troops offered by Chiang, but he found little support. 
Acheson continued his oppos1t1on presented previously and added that the 
use of Nat1onal1st troops might provoke the Chinese Reds to enter the 
fighting to inflict damage on the Generalissimo's troops. The Chiefs of 
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Staff poi m:ed out that the troops offered by the Chinese would have 
very few modern weapons and equipment and would be virtually as helpless 
as the South Korean army. Furthermore, the transportation required 
by the Chinese would be more profitably used by being assigned to 
carry American soldiers and supplies. 
Also during the conference, Truman stressed that he did not want 
the group to lock their attention solely on Korea and fail to give the 
matter a contextual evaluation. He posed such questions as· What is 
Mao Tse-tung planning? How might the Russians react 1n the Balkans, 
Germany, or Iran? 
At the close of the conference, the President was still concerned 
with the ability of the limited U S. troops available to stand off the 
enemy, but after further discuss1on, ne agreed that the Chinese offer of 
troops should be declined. Truman then decided to give MacArthur full 
authority to use the ground forces under his command) Nhich included 
all combat troops he could spare from Japan. At the suggestion of 
Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, a second order was added 
a naval blockade of the Korean coast. At l ·22 P.M. on Friday, June 30, 
the orders left Washington which put the United States irrevocably 1n 
the war. 44 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN ANALYSIS OF MESSAGE PROPERTIES AND 
RELATIONSHIPS 
11 The pol 1 t1cal orator, 11 as Aristotle maintained, 11 aims at 
establ1sh1ng the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course 
1 of action 11 Truman was doubtlessly well aware of that truth when 
on July 19, 1950, and again, about six weeks later, on September 1, 
he went before the American people to explain and defend the 
decisions he had made about the Korean Conflict. It 1s the purpose 
of this chapter to analyze those national addresses from two 
perspectives: (1) the value-propositions or Justificatory arguments 
Truman presented3 and (2) the strategic appeals he employed. 
The methodology used rn the cri t1 cal ana lys 1 s of Truman 1 ,s 
addresses 1s derived primarily from the writings of Kenneth Burke. 
fo A Rhetoric of Motives,Burke discusses the concept of ident1f1cat1on 
as it relates to rhetor1c--the art of persuasion. He ma1nta1ns that 
language originated because of man 1 s cond1t1on of separateness from 
h1s fflllows and his need for cooperation. Burke explains that 11 /\ 1s 
I 
not identical with n1s colleague, B. But insofar as their interests 
are Jornec:i A is 1dent1f1ed with Bo Or he may 1dent1fy himself wicn 
B even when their interests are not Joined, 1f he assumes that they Rre, 
or 1s persL1aded to believe so 112 Burke further explarns that 1t 1s 
11 cl early a matter of rheton c to persuade a man Dy i d2n t1 fyrng your 
3 (:ause with h1s 1nterest. 11 
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Working from this Burkean or1entat1on suggested the diagram as 
a useful analytic tool 1n exam1n1ng Truman's speeches In appl1cat1on, 
this diagram exposes the probable immediate relat1onsh1p between the 
1denti f1er Truman used and the audiences he addressed Identifiers which 
have the effect of supporting an audience's immediate interests are 
assigned a Pos1t1ve Value. Ident1f1ers conflicting with the immediate 
interests of a given audience are assigned a Negative Value. 
Truman's July 19th Address 
Truman's first national address was delivered from the White House 
at 10:30 P.M. EST. The following represents the analytical diagram Just 
described 








Communist forces used armed aggression against South Koreao 
Aggression 1n Korea threat to all free-world nations. 
Aggression in Korea demonstrates Communist's unwillingness 
to work cooperatively 1n world community. 
Aggression rn Korea 1s threat to world community of free 
nations. 
The challenge of aggression must be met with firmness. 
Nature of 1nvas1on shows long plann10g. 
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*USSR means not orily Russia, but the ennre CcmmL1i11s t world 
























8. UN recommended that members help restore peace and 
repel attack 
9. F1 fty-two of f1 fty-nrne UN members support UN recommen-
dat10n 
10. History shows appeasement 1n the face of aggression 
leads to war. 
11. At stake 1n Korea is US security and world peace. 
12. Other UN member nations are sending forces to Korea. 
13. UN forces are under command of General MacArthur. 
14. Prompt UN action landmark of rule of law. 
15. Russia has failed to endorse efforts to stop war. 
16. Russia refused to use 1nfluence to stop fighting before 
UN action. 
17. Russia has espoused desire for peace but supports 
aggress 10n. 
18 US will continue to support UN action to restore peace. 
19. The fight 1n Korea will be hard and tough. 
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Korean defenders making brave fight. 
Our forces have fought well and re1nforcements are 
arr, vrng. 
Reports from Generals Collins and MacArthur. 
Reports are reassuring but show task 1n Korea will be 
difficult. 
Sim1lar acts of aggression may happen in other parts 
of world. 
Free nations must be on guard against sneak attack. 
Free nations must build beyond the requirements of Korea 
S1tuat1on in Korea w1ll require men, equipment, and 
suppl1es 
Increases in armed forces will come from volunteers, 
Selective Service, and National Guard and Reserves 
The cost of military expansion as presently invisaged 
is ten b1ll1on dollars. 
Common defense among free nations 1s best hope for peace 
The US is rich and productive. 
Some resources for defense will have to come from 
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S1gn1f1cant Ident1f1er Audience 
34. Installment buying will have to be l1m1ted. USSR 
us 
A 111 es 
35 Credit will have to be restrained USSR 
us 
A 111 es 
36. Defense needs will bring about substantial tax increases. USSR 
us 
All 1 es 
37. Defense will require increased production. USSR 
us 
All 1es 
38. Military needs are large--hard work needed. USSR 
us 
All 1 es 
39. Hoarding, especially food, 1s foolish. USSR 
us 
A 11 i es 
40. If there was danger of shortages, controls would be USSR 
instituted. us 
All 1 es 
41. The US has resources sufficient to meet needs. USSR 
us 
A 111 es 
42. The US is willing and able to pay the price for freedom. USSR 
us 
All 1 es 
43. The US 1s the leader of the free-world commun1tyo USSR 
us 
A 111 es 
44. The US believes 1n freedom and peace for all men USSR 
us 
A 111 es 
45. Our Crea~or intended that men be free and at peace. USSR 
us 
A 11 i es 
As Burke reminds us:i 11 You persuade a man only rn so far nS you can 







































1 dea, 1 dent, fy1 ng your ways w1 th h1 s. 115 S1 nee Truman was concerned w1 th 
essentially three aud1ences(the Communists - USSR, the American public - US, 
and other free nations of the world - All1es), the effect of each 1dent1f1er 
may differ from one audience to anothero 
Robert T. Oliver, 1n The Psychology of Persuasive Speech, argues 
that 11 the persuasive speaker needs to learn .•. to look through and 
around the differences to the more fundamental and meaningful factors of 
1dent1ficat1on. 116 Hence, Truman 1 s problem involved matching and managing 
several series of relat1onsh1ps between ideas and audiences. 
Truman begins his July 19 address by 1dent1fying the invasion of 
South Korea with the security of the United States, the other free nations 
of the world, and with world peace 1n general. There are obviously many 
levels at
1
wh1ch ident1f1cat1on 1s possible between people and between 
nations. Nations can identify 1n the areas of trade, defense, background, 
etc. However, there seems to be no level of 1dent1ficat1on more fundamental 
to a nat1on or 1nd1v1dual than that of security. The US and Russia had 
exper, enced 1 ong, a 1 ack of 1 dent, f1 cat, on concern mg Korea except rn a 
negative sense. When North Korea invaded South Korea, this represented a 
negative 1dent1f1cat1on 1n a most fundamental sense. 
When Truman declared that the 1nvas1on of South Korea represented 
a threat to all free nations of the world, he essentially states to the 
world the level and form of 1dent1f1cat1on created by the s1tuat1on 1n 
Koreao Although important to h1s Arnencan audience, in a technical 
sense it was much more important to the Communists. Only by knowing the 
percept1on of 1 mportance (lev2l of 1oent1ficat1on) assigned to the 
invasion by ~he United States and other free nat1ors could the Communists 
evaluate their pos1t1on 1n terns of free-world response. 
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The importance of recognizing the level of identif1cac1on 
appears significant 1f one 1s to understand why Truman uses negative 
identifiers exclusively 1n terms of the Communist audience This 
would suggest that Truman felt the s1tuat1on was either beyond the 
point of effectively using pos1t1ve 1dent1f1ers, or that by so doing, 
he would not be speaking their language. In any case it would seem 
that Truman 1 s use of negative 1dentif1ers with regard to the Communist 
audience is in keeping with Burke's idea of 1dentifyrng "your ways with 
his 11 and with Oliver 1 s conclusion that 1dent1f1cation can be found at a 
11 fundamental 11 level even when higher levels of identificai::ion can't 
be ach1eveds 
Ident1f1ers used with regard to other free nations (Allies) 
represent, as would be expected, almost a complete turn around from the 
negative approach concerning the Communists Every negative 1dent1fier 
associated w1th the Communists would likely be positively identified 
with by the Al lies, every positive 1dentif1er used with regard to the 
American audience would likely be perceived as positive, and even 
negative identifiers used with regard to the American audience shows 
some positive implications concerning the Allies. For example, 
1dent1f1ers thirty-three through thirty-six, concerning credit, 
restrictions, and taxes, which would negatively 1dent1fy with the American 
audience, would have the probable immediate effect on allied nat10ns of 
de~onstrat1ng support and determination. 
Although the 1dent1f1ers used rn terms of effect on the American 
audience were mostly positive, the number of negative ident1f1ers used 
suggests they were used to demonstrate determrnat1on to the Communists 
rather chan expla1n1ng how things were going to be 1n the future for 
the American public. This 111terpretat1on certarnly does riot rule out 
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the poss1b1lity that Truman felt the need to soften the blow of the war 
on the economy by pl acing the requ1 rements of the war \1/1 thin the context 
not only of should, but of can and must. Robert Oliver says that 11 the 
persuasive speaker chooses for his audience the kinds of facts, and 
presents them in such a manner as he believes will do them the most 
good. 117 Truman 1 s problem was that he had several audiences with conflict-
ing needs. 
In addition to the function of identification, Burke says that a 
speech provides the answers to the quest10ns posed by the total 
situation ,n which the speaker finds hi
1
mself. 8 Burke continues by 
saying that in answering the questions~ the answers given in a speech 
are more than Just answers, 11 they are strategic answers, stylized answers. 119 
These answers ''size up" the s1 tuati ans, name their structure and outstanding 
1Y1gred1ents, and made them rn such a way that con tarns an attnude to1,1,1ards 
them. 1110 Based on the assumption that the propos1t1o~s contained in a 
speech are not presented by chance but by strategic arrangement representative 
of the inductive 11 s1zrng up 11 of the situation by the speaker, 1 t would seem 
that an analysis of speech strategies would reveal much about the speech 
and the speaker~ Truman's strategic arrangement is represented on the 
following page by Figure l. 
W1th1n the framework of the strategic alignment of Truman 1 s first 
national address 3 he first sets about to answer the quest1on of what the 
Korean rnvas 10n rreant rn terms of the Um ted States and the Free-world rn 
general. After making the statement that the 1nvas1on posed a threat to 
all free nations, he proceeds to offer propos1t1ons to support his 
conclusion. He discusses the 1nvas1on 1n terms of the rule of law and 
the United Nations. He then presem:s a brief history of Korea follo1,,11rng 
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Figure 1 
A STRATEGY REPRESENTATION OF TRUMAN'S JULY 19TH ADDRESS 
Introduction 
J, 
Significance of Korean 
aggression 
- The US and other 
free nat10ns w111 pay the 
price for freedom - no matter 
Aggression 1n Korea has 
demonstrated Commun, st I s~ 
w1ll1ngness to use armed 
aggression.I 
Aggression 1n Korea is 
threat to all free nations 
of the world and the rule 
of law. I 
tiil 
The UN was established to 
handle matters like Korea. 
! 
Aggression in Korea poses 
the question of what price 
free nations are willing 
to pay for their freedom. 
(Question) 
! 
/ w?/he cost. l 
Actions 1n Korea by The economy will 
free nations demonstrate have to make some 
willingness to meet adJustments. 
aggress1 ol w1 th force. T 
1 Aggression rn Korea left , The US has the 
, free nations with no choice capability to meet 
but to fight. defense production 
Free nations sought to 
avoid conflict through 
the United Nations. 
requirements. 
Free-world defen~e 
. requirements are 
great. I 
History shows that appease-
ment 1n the face of aggression 
only leads to eventual war. 
Russia has demonstrated 
un½1ll1ngness to work 
w1th1n the rule of law. 
1 The US w1ll have 
to bear much of 
defense burden 9 
1 L tr 
The United States supported j 
the UN action 1n Korea because~ 
J, 
own security was at stake 
l 
The unw1 ll1ngness of the Free nations must 
Comm~n1sts to work w1th1n~ prepare beyond -
world community presen cs 1 the requ1 rements 
1 world-wide p0Lent1dl for I of Korea. 
' aggres~10~ LJ, 
J~Jl,~~-· -- L_ __ --- ' 
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World War II and how the triangular relationship petween Korea, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States came about. He describes the 
act1v1ties of the United Nations with regard to Korea in an apparent 
attempt to show obJectiv1ty on the part of the United States 1n 
dealing with Korea. And finally, he gives evidence that the 1nvas1on 
was totally without provocation from South Korea but planned and 
supported 1n such a way as to demonstrate long preparation on the part 
of the Communists. 
Truman then returns to the matter of the United Nations and 
its part in dealing with the Korean crisis. Having spent the preceerl1ng 
five years working to establish the United Nations as a body to handle 
national differences 1n a democratic way, Truman obviously knew there 
would be little or no need to argue for the rule of law in the future 
if the United States and other free nations operated outside the rule 
of law concerning Korea. In other words, the s1tuat1on 1n Korea, as 
perceived by Truman, represented a test of the United Nat, ans and 1 ts 
ability to carry out the rule of law. 
In describing the actions taken by the UN members, Truman appears 
to be rnt1matrng the primary quest, on posed oy the aggress 10n :1 11 What 
price 1 s the free-world w111 mg to pay for freedomt 1 In answer, ng 
this quest, on, he reports the overwhelming UN response ( f1 fty-two of 
f1fty-n1ne members) to restore peace 1n Korea. 
It is interesting to note how Truman uses certain propositions to 
cross-reinforce certain other propos1t1ons. For instance, he suggests that 
th.e United States supported the UN decision concerning Korea because 1c 
was threateried by the Korean aggression and had no c..ho1ce bu-c to fight. 
Supporcing the propos1trnn of 11 no choice ou-c to f1gn-c,11 he recalls that 
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appeasement in the 1930 1 s lead to general war In answering the impl1ed 
question of 11 Hhat price freedom? 11 Truman suggests that the response already 
made by the UN member nations demonstrate conclusively the value placed 
on freedom by free nations. 
Another question Truman suggests through his alignment of propositions 
1s, "What 1s the s1gn1f1cance of Korea beyond Korea? 11 In answering th1s 
ques~1on he discusses the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to work with 
or w1th1n the UN, the Soviet Union's unwillingness to use its influence 
to halt the aggression 1n Korea, and the ominous threat presented by the 
Communist's demonstrated willingness to use armed aggression. 
At this point in Truman's speech, he sets forth a multi-faceted 
rationale that the aggression 1n Korea posed a threat to all free nations 
and to world peace, that the United Nations was the organization to handle 
the matter, that the free-world had no choice but to meet force with force~ 
and that the willingness of the Communists to use armed aggression posed 
a world-wide problem With these claims admitted 1n evidence, he then 
moved to the spec1f1c 1 requ1rements demanded by the s1tuat1on not only 1n 
Korea but throughout the world. He discusses the need for cooperation and 
mutual defense among free nations. At this point 1n the speech, Tru~an 
counters v1 rtua lly every negat, ve aspect of che Korean s 1 tuati on w1 th 
a positive US/free-world oriented rationale. It 1s at this point that 
Truman 1 s strategy takes an interesting turn that stro~g1y suggests his 
concern with br1ng1ng about some coord1nat1on with the Soviet Union 1n terms 
of expectations. By rnumeratrng the hardsh1 ps the Amen can people were 
w1lli1g to bear, Truman achieves t~e effect of demonstrating determ1~at1on 
to the Commun1sts (negative value), while, at th~ same time~ producing a 
negative 1dent1f1cat1on w1th the Amer1c2n people Truman does little to 
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soften the impact of the hardships oiher than to say that the United 
States has a II n ch and product, ve economy 11 and 11 the resources ll to meet 
11 the needs. 
Before answering the most central question suggested by the 
strategic alignment of propositions w1th1n the speech, that of what 
price freedom, Truman counters existing Soviet reports of internal 
d1v1sion in America by stating that 11 the American people are unified 
in their belief in democratic freedom ... [and]~ .. rn detesting 
Communist slavery. 1112 This prefacing of the central answer certarnly 
adds force to the statement that Amer, cans "are determined to preserve 
[their] ..• freedom--no matter the cost. 13 
Having answered the central question and lesser questions relating 
to ,t, Truman ends his address by placing the whole matter within a moral 
context. Adding to the propositions of 11 appeasement leads to war 11 and 
11 free nations were forced to fight, 11 Truman ends with the proposit10n 
that the "Creator rntended 11 all men to l 1 ve rn freedom and peace. The 
obvious extension to this propos1t1on 1s that all men of God must unite 
against the immorality of aggression. 
In terms of the American public and Amer1can allies, the response 
to Truman 1 s address and to his other actions concerning Korea was generally 
favorable. Although the American public seemed fearful of the war, the 
feel mg also existed that prosperity would follow. In the words of Elmo 
Roper of Fortune: 11 People seemed to assume that while war news might 
mean years of personal worry and suffering, 1t also probably meant 
i:hat they would soon be rn the midst of a wartime prosperity .. 11 Roper 
con-crnues by saying that although 11 these thoughts gave the people 1 s 
outlook an opt1m1snc tinge rn the first days of -che war/' had they 
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taken into full account the burdens war would br1ng--rat1on1ng, higher 
taxes, allocat1ons, and controls--perhaps their mood might have changed.14 
After the initial surge of approval of the adm1nistration 1 s 
handling of the Communist aggression 1n Korea began to fade, even the 
action they supported began to seem flawed 1n the eyes of Truman's 
opponents. Republicans found much appeal to popular op1n1on 1n accusing 
the administration, and specifically Secretary of State Acheson, of inv1t1ng 
the attack. Adm1n1strat1on critics assured the public that by stating 
on January 12 that Korea and Formosa were outside the American defense 
perimeter, Acheson had given the Communists a guarantee of 1mmun1ty. 
Much of President Truman's decline in popularity, first observable 
around the beg1nn1ng of August, can be attr1buLed to State Department 
related problems~ Nevertheless, there were certainly other contributory 
causes: d1sl1ke of the Korean War, fear of renewed wartime restr1ct1ons, 
rising 1nflat1on, growing power of labor unions, etc. The d1sl1ke of the 
Korean War involved more than Just the dislike of f1ght1ng; it involved 
not l1k1ng the l1mi!ed aspect of fighting. The American people had always 
fought to win, to defeat the aggressor. The Korean War was different and 
the people resented not adhering to precedent. In discussing the effect 
of precedent, Thomas C. Shelling, 1n The Strategy of Conflict, says that 
11 precedent seems to exercise an influence that greatly exceeds 1ts-]og1cal 
importance or legal force. 1115 
The news media certainly did much to tar Truman w1ch the brush 
of 1rresporis1b1lity, to blame him totally for allowing Korea to happen 
The July 24th ed1t1on of Life stated 
Because Harry S Truman 1s a pol1t1c1an, during tne 1948 campaign 
he promised the people so~e expensive things - continued high farm 
price suoports, increased social security - and 1n order to pay off 
his campaign promises he took the money from the military budget. 
He gambled t~at we would not need Forrestal 1 s combat forces and lost 
the gamble 10 
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And the fear brought about by Truman I s a 11 eged II bung l mg 11 ~vas g 1 ven added 
emphasis by such articles as the follovnng from Fortune. 11 The U. S. must 
accept the poss1b1l1ty of an all-out war with Russia that could come 
tomorrow ... The U S might have to support two or three Korean-scale 
opera t1 ans simultaneously. 1117 
During the month of August the battle 1n Korea began to show the 
first but weak signs of progress for the UN forces. On the homefront, 
however, the transition toward a stronger military pbsture was being felt 
directly by the American people. On August 30, a New York Times article 
said, 11 An uneasiness over the threats of a r1srng spiral of prices runs 
through the many simple, hand written notes that have reached the 
President's desk. 1118 
Truman's September 1st Address 
President Truman delivered his second national address at 10:00 P.M. 
EST on September 1, 1950. The same diagnostic approach that was used on the 
first speech will again be employed not only to analyze the internal elements 
of the speech itself, but to provide a comparative basis for Judgment. The 
following diagram depicts the relat1onship between the identifiers used, 
the audiences identified with, and the probable immediate 
S1gn1f1can~ Identifier 
1. Pres1dent 1 s concern for f1ght1ng men in Korea. 
2. Men 1n Korea are fighting age-old struggle for human 
l 1 berty. 






















4. America must put aside all else to support fighting men. 
5. For the first time many na~1ons are fighting unaer one 
f1 ag. 
6. Chaos follows if rule of law 1s not upheld. 
7. The raw aggression 1n Korea left only two choices -
appeasement or force. 
8. History teaches appeasement leads to more aggression 
and war. 
9. The firm handling of aggression 1s best hope of 
achieving peace. 
10. What 1s at stake 1n Korea 1s American way of life. 
11. US cannot long be free if other free nations are 
dominated. 
12. US and most other nations have worked for self-govern-
ment world-wide 
13. Communist nations have worked to hamper a Just peace. 
14. Russia has violated pledges of 1nternat1onal 
cooperation. 
15 Communis~s preach peace but practice aggression. 





All 1 es 
USSR 
us 
A 111 es 
USSR 
us 











A 111 es 
USSR 
us 
All 1 es 
USSR 
us 
A 111 es 
USSR 
us 






A 111 es 
USSR 
us 
























































UN able to act in Korea because free nations worked 
together 
Americans can be proud of US role 1n creation of UN. 
US has taken lead step over last years 1n effort to 
unite and strengthen free nations. 
The struggle between freedom and Communism has brought 
free nations together. 
Fifty-three of the f1fty-n1ne UN members Joined to 
meet challenge of Cowmun1st aggression 1n Korea. 
The US and South Korea have had to bear brunt of 
fighting but other nations are Jo1n1ng the fight. 
All troops will fight under one flag and under 
General MacArthur. 
The build up to five d1v1sions 1n eight weeks has been 
dramatic. 
American troops have fought well uoder d1ff1cult 
conditions. 
Amen can men have fought wnh ga 11 ao try and honor. 
South Korean sold1ers have foughL fiercely. 
Korean population 1s g1v1ng support to UN forces 
Val 1 ant f1 ght1 ng 1 s bn ng1 ng resul cs - enemy attacks 
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Enemy is spending strength - invasion has reached peak 
Power to crush invasion is being gathered. 
Korea 1s only part of larger struggle. 
The US must build beyond the ne2ds of fighting in 
Korea. 
Free nations of the world are Joining US to develop 
mutual defense. 
US will have to increase Armed Forces, equipment, 
and resources 
The economy of US has never been stronger, and the 
time has come when more of that strength will have to 
go to defense. 
Germany and Japan miscalculated ten years ago; we must 
insure would-be aggressors make no such m1scalculat1ons 
again. 
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39. Th€ trans1t1on fro~ peace to world-wide defense requires USSR Neg 
certain sacrifices and restrictions 1n order to meet the US Neg 
challenge. Allies Pos 
40. The US believes 1n the UN 
41. Koreans ought to be free, independent, and united 
42 US does no~ want Korea to expand into general war. 
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Significant Identifier Audience Value 
43 US does not want China to be misled or forced to 
oppose UN 
44. US does noL want any part of Asia for itself. 
45. US believes in freedom for all Far East nations. 
46. The US does not believe 1n a preventive war. 
47. The US wants and will achieve peace. 
48. North Koreans have learned the penalties of following 
the dark and bloody path of Communism. 
49. The US has been called to give of its 1eadership 9 
efforts, and resources to maintain peace and Justice 
among free nations 
50. Although the task ahead is great, the US will not fail. 
51. We ask for God 1 s help in the days ahead. 
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A 11 ,es 
Truman began his September 1st address by attempting to 1dent1fy 
with the American audience at the same basic level (self-interest) as 
used 1n his previous address Whereas Truman began his first speech 




























second speech began with the establishment of a triangular relat1onsh1p 
betv1een Truman., the Arner, can aud1 ence, and the Amer, can soldiers fi ghtrng 
1n Korea. By stating his concern for the soldiers and acknowledging the 
obvious concern of their relatives and friends aL home, Truman established 
94 
with the audience a very personal kind of 1dent1f1cat1on. In all other 
respects, however, the second speech appears to be a revised and updated 
version of the first Truman repeats the same basic propositions of 
"appeasement leads to war" and II Free nations were forced to fight. 11 He 
expands the reference to the Axis aggression of the 1930 1 s to argue by 
analogy that the Axis powers made a miscalculation then, and the 
Communists have miscalculated now. He uses the case of Axis aggression 
again in the middle of his address to demonstrate that the United States 
defeated the Axis nations with much less in terms of industrial production 
than now, and 1s therefore obviously capable of meeting the Communist 
challenge. Finally, Truman reaffirms the rightness of the role of the 
United Nations in handling the situation 1n Korea. As in his previous 
speech, he continues to give evidence of the Russian's unwillingness to abide 
by the rule of law, a rule which Truman believed embodied the ideal of the 
United Nations. 
In an obvious attempt to answer the question of why the United 
States had to carry most of the load in Korea, Truman presents a brief 
hi stori ca 1 review of the acti ans taken by the U. S. to counter the 
Communists, during his adm1n1stration His arguments from history are 
based on the fact that the U.S. took the n1ead step. 11 Here, the 
subtle implication is that if the U.S. doesn't take the first step, no 
step will be taken. Truman is thus articulating a 11 world 11 or 11 global 11 
philosophy. 
Truman's address 1s clearly characterized by a series of propos1t1onal 
dichotomies 1n that he places Free-world actions, goals, and achievements 
on one side and those of the Communists on the other. This technique 
tends to give the effect of proof by ant1thes1s, i e 3 free nations are 
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good/Communist nations are bad, rule of law is winning/rule of force 1s 
losing, tne path of democracy leads LO freedom/the path of Communism 
leads to blood and darkness. (See Figure 2) 
The most central question answered by Truman's second address 
concerns the matter of how to prevent the Communistsfrom m1scalculat1ng 
further. Truman suggests the importance and obviousness of the question 
and then proceeds to demonstrate the obviousness of the answer through 
numerous propositions bearing either directly on the answer, the question, 
or other supporting propositions. This technique, though a departure 
from standard plans of organization, presents a strong unifying effect 
through multiple cross-reinforcement of propositions. 
Looking back to the questions Truman posed and answered in his 
first address and the context within which that first speech functioned, 
there is strong reason to surmise that he was concerned with communicating 
certain conv1ct1ons to the Communises even at the expense of reducing the 
appeal and impact of his statements on the Ame~ican audience. In his 
second speech, Truman shows a definite but weak shift toward the American 
audience as though he hoped to reclaim their support and attempted to 
place a higher evaluation on the meaning and implications of Korea. This 
overture apparently grew out of the fact that Korea had by this time become 
for many Americans a symbolic threat over and beyond its actuality. 
When the two addresses are evaluated in terms of Truman's four 
criteria for effective foreign policy (clarity, forcefulness, dec1s1veness, 
and determ,nation),20 it seems that his words and s~rateg1es more closely 
approximated an extension of his foreign policy actions than they reflected 
his concern for domestic approval In other words, these two speeches were 
parL of a verbal war with the Communists rather than a wooing or courting 
of the American people 
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F1 gure 2 
A STRATEGY REPRESENTATION OF TRUMAN'S SEPTEMBER 1ST SPEECH 
Introduction 
PROBLEM Empathy with audience SOLUTION 
i 
How to attain peace Communist goal is domination World-wide de~errenc 
through rule of law. through rule of force. through combined 
! t1: . . a :) strength of free 
ff ~nations 
US hj_s_o_u_g_h_t_r_u_l e_o_f _______ .__1.----------~ .~ 
law through the UN. 
i 
Communists have worked 




Korea is only 
part of larger 
struggle. I 
miscalculated/ 
,r, »~»" ,~ y 
Korean invasion The Communists 
forced free in Korea. j 
nations to 
fight. 
I W 1]; 
Rule of law 1s winning The rule of force 1s losing 
in Korea. <f---;!) rn Korea. I 
4 J Free nations must prepare Communism represents world-wide 
beyond Korea. threat 1 
J.., \Y 
4 
The US can and must The path of Communist aggression 
lead free nations in ~-..; leads only to blood and darkness. 
p~eparat1on. 





l ' ;, -:l} A fut u re m 1 s ca 1 cul at 10 n 
could bring WW III 
' 
The nations of the 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in the first chapter, the problem investigated 1n this 
study centered on the relationship between Truman 1 s war rhetoric during 
the first six months of the Korean Conflict and h1s decline 1n popularity 
that began Just following the outset of the war. The approach taken to 
this problem involved tracing the development of Truman as a rhetorical 
agent and of the Korean Conflict as a rhetor1ca1 exigence. Exam1n1ng the 
nature and results of the encounter between the agent and the exigence 
Has considered a crucial prerequisite to understanding Trurnan 1 s handlrng 
of a 11 hot 11 war in a 11 cold 11 war context. 
In the second chapter ive noticed that Truman be9Rll !Jl s bu, i drng 
\ 
of personal character and human understanding at a very early age S1nce 
having to wear very thick-lensed glasses prevented him from partic1pat1~q 
1n rough and tumble youth games, he turned to reading almost eve,~ book 
h2 cculd find. As a result of h1s extensive read1ng~ he beca~e well versed 
i11 history and the Bible. There are strong 1nd1cat 1ons that Truman 1 s 
knowledge of human nature and h1stor1cal events not only gave him a 
~n1qJe ?ercept1on of himself and his world, bu~ created w1th1n h~n an 
apo"::tite ror life and l1vrng. Truman applied his undf::rsrandrno ta the: 
various s1tuat1ons that confronted him and used each expe1·1cnce to exterd~ 
corf1rrn, and refrne h1s existing perceptions o-:=: man and of ma11 1 s reldt•on-
Closely corn~cted co Truman 1 s perccpt10~ o~ ma~ and ct Lhe 
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natural and recurring order of events was his conv1ct1on of rightness. 
When the events in his life brought him to the point that would have 
defeated men of weaker substance, Truman seemed to look beyond the 
immediate implications of the situation and framed h1s responses 
accordingly. When h1s clothing store failed during the depression, 
it would have been expedient for him to have eliminated his debts 
through bankruptcy proceedings; instead, he held himself above defeat by 
accepting the responsibility for the store debts. And he could have 
walked away from the second senate race after everyone said that, without 
Tom Pendergast, he was through~ but he had to prove h1s opponents wrong 
and himself right. When Harry Truman was sure he was right., he had the 
ability to convince others that he was right, too. Truman made mistakes 
1n his attempts to do the right thing, but he never abandoned his belief 
in rightness as the basis for human action. 
Truman's pre-pol1t1cal life brought him rnto contact w1 th ma11y 
people and many occupations. It was his varied exper1ences that enabled 
him to identify with a wide spectrum of the American population, including 
farmers~ railroad workers, bankers, veterans, and laborers in general. 
His willingness to speak out on matters of equal opportunity identified 
him with minor1Ly groups. H1s lack of sophistication 1n speech, appearance 
or manner furthered h1s identification with the humble and bespoke a 
character that, while inflexible, was altogether believable. H1s broad-
spectrum ident1f1cation and cr<2d1b1lity, combined W1Lh an unusual 
perceptiveness and grasp of human nature, gave Truman persuasive qual1t1es 
r.ot understood or appreciated by his oppon2nts. 
Truman 1 s pol1t1cal lrfe prior to his becJ1nrng Pres1dent provided 
h1rn vn th the opportum ty to demonstrate h Is strong persoral characcer 
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and to achieve high credibility despite rn1t1ally being labeled a pawn 
of the Pendergast political machine. Evidence strongly suggests that 
Truman's subsequent credibility was additionally enhanced by his having 
been wrongly perce1ved in1t1ally. 
After Truman succeeded to the Presidency, his popularity with 
the American public was far from consistenL Immediately after he took 
office, the public generally understood the vastness of the task Truman 
faced and identified with him strongly. As the pains of changing from 
a nation at war to a nation at peace began to affect the public, however, 
empathy turned to dissatisfaction and blame as Truman became increasingly 
identified with the Nat1on 1 s 111s by h1s opponents. On the other hand, 
his popularity soared when he was able -co demonstrate some form of personal 
strength 1n dealing positively with nations, individuals, or issues 
perceived as being inconc1stent with the interests of the American public. 
Truman found h1msel f more and more rn the m1 ddl e ,of trying to 
satisfy contending forces, and each decision normally resulted rn one 
or more of the contenders becoming unhappy with the outcome. This meant 
essentially that many decisions resulted 1n an unfavorable outcome to 
someone) the cause of whose unhappiness could be associated directly with 
' Truman. Admin1strat1on opponents seemingly never failed to use every 
opportunity to publicly identify Trur.ian v-nth any unfavorable aspect of a 
dec1s1on made by him or a member of h1s admrn1strat1on. The more dec1s1ons 
made by the administration, and many \1 ere made, the greater the chance of 
mistake, the grea~er the number of contending factions unhappy, and the 
more read, ly available che oppon:ur.1 ty to en t1 c1 ze and undermine. By 
June, 1950) Truman's popularity wit~ the American people had experienced 
a progressive decline for almost a year dnd a half. 
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When South Korea was invaded by the North Korean Commu~ists, 
Truman was forced to decide between doing nothing and taking a stand 
for the rule of law. A decision to do nothing was perceived as representing 
an open 1nv1tat1on to similar acts 1n the future that would eventually have 
to be halted on a larger scale Truman obviously determined that the 
Commun, s ts had to be stopped rn Korea and that any delay would make the 
job more difficult and possibly bring about a direct confrontation with 
Russia 
By deciding to take action to prevent the Communist takeover of 
South Korea, Truman also accepted the task of conv1nc1ng the Communists 
that they had mis cal cu 1 ated, as He 11 as convrncrng the Amen can people 
that it was in their best interest to support his decision. Of the two 
tasks, Truman was much more concerned with convincing the Communists and 
reducing the poss1b1l1ty of a nuclear war. 
It is important to understand that national interests do not 
coincide with the self-interests of the 1ndiv1duals wak1ng up the nation. 
It 1s apparent that it 1s no~ in the best interest of the men in a rifle 
squad to have them assault a fortified enemy position, but such action 
may represent the only way to save the remainder of the platoon or company. 
At the national level, as with the rifle squad, 1n t 1 me of war the interests 
,of a few are subordinated to the interests of the whaler Still, emotional 
tensions will remain, even 1n the face of right reason and impeccable logic. 
The expenditure of human lives has never bee~ popular, but what 
makes the effects of a limited war, such as the Korean Conflict, different 
from the effects of a general war, such as World War II, 1s s1gn1f1cant 
1n underscand1n~ Trumar 1 s rhetoric and his decline 1n popularity 
wn:h the American people. In a gereral war, the end normally comes as 
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a result of beating or being beaten by the opposition. The consequences 
of losing a general war are not restricted to the soldiers on the battle-
field but affects every man, woman!) and child. It affects the banker, 
the nurse, the teacher, the rich, and the poor The only choice available 
to the public 1n a general war 1s between winning and losing, which 1s 
really no choice at all. It 1s therefore easy for the adroit rhetorician 
to emotionalize the idea of winning a total war totally~ 
Unlike the immediate and obvious consequences of the general war, 
the l1m1ted war poses no immediate threat to the population and is based 
essentially on the needs of the nation to maintain a power balance. The 
apparent proposition supporting the limited war 1s that an imbalance of 
power leads to general war, and general war 1n a nuclear age between 
nuclear powers produces no winner. And unlike the lack of choice inherent 
to a general war, the l1m1ted war, since 1t poses no 1mmed1ate threat, 
does not reduce the options to kill or be killed. In the words of Robert 
T. Oliver rn The Psychology of Persuasive Speech, "people can only be 
induced ivi 11 rngly to do what they desire to do. 111 It 1 s the lack of 
choice 1n a general war that induces people to fight for their lives and 
the lives of their relatives and friends. And it is the lack of a similar 
1 nducement 1 nherent 1 n a l 1m1 ted war that produces an umn 111 ngness 1 n the 
people to forfeit their lives and comforts for a cause too distant co be 
' perceived clearly and strongly9 As explarned by Aristotle~ '\,Je do not fear 
thrngs that are a very long way off· for instance., we all know we shall 
die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death 1s not close at hand. 112 
Stated succinctly, Truman faced a rhetorical task w1th regard to the 
,ll.mencan people that was virtually 1mposs1ble. 
Truman found himself rhetorically 1n the middle of contending 
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forces (American and Russian) as far as the Korean Conflict was concerned. 
Knowing that all public utterances made by the President are essentially 
foreign policy statements, Truman was compelled to frame his rhetorical 
responses largely along foreign policy lines. Since Truman admittedly 
involved the United States in the Korean Conflict for the purpose of 
preventing a third world war, it seems no less f1tt1ng that he should 
pursue the same goal rhetorically. 
The Truman Administration had been accused of uberng soft on 
Commun, srn, 11 but Truman d1 d not use the Korean Con fl 1 ct as a forum for 
d1scred1t1ng his accusers. Truman was being cut to pieces for the 
defense posture of the nat10n that 11 1nvi ted 11 the attack on South Korea, 
yet he d1d not use the Korean crisis as a forum to point the finger of 
( 
guilt at others. In view of the existing Communist repor-cs that America 
was a divided nat 1 on, one might contend that Truman d1d not use the 
Korean cr1s1s to improve his own cred1b1l1ty with the American people 
because of the adve~se effect on his foreign policy statements. It 
stands to reason that Truman cou 1 d not have demonstrated Amen can 
determ1nat1on concerning Korea had he addressed matters of partisan 
politics 
As previously mentioned in the fourth chapter~ there are different 
levels at which persuasion can effectively occur, depend1ng on the parties 
involved. Truman chose to 11 speak 11 the language of the Communists at the 
most basic level by meeting force w1tn force Yet when he sought to 
1dent1fy the Korean aggression \'11th the Amencan audience, the attempt 
was made -co correlate the sacnf1ce of Amencan 11ves v1ith right-doing 
and the perceived Communist threat Th1s 1s not stated as a cr1t1c1sm 
of Trumar) but merely to point out that ro pos1t1ve level of correlac1on 
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ex1sLed. The problem 1nhere~t in an attempt to 1dent1fy th1ngs thaL 
are d1fferent, such as r1ght-do1ng w1th the sacr1f1ce of human life, in-
volves the var1at1on of pr1or1t1es. What 1s being suggested here 1s that 
identification can only occur effectively when r1ght-do1ng or the threat 
of Communism are perceived at the same level of importance as preservation 
of human life. 
In Truman's attempt to reach the people with h1s addresses, 1t 
could be argued that h1s rhetoric was not effective because he did not 
say everyLhrng about one topic before movrng to the next. It was al so 
true that h1s speeches demonstrated a loose relationship between value-
propos1t1ons or arguments. There ~,nll probably always be those who view 
Truman's rhetoric 1n negative terms~ because he did things differently. 
But I tend to agree with the view of his rhetoric espoused by Brockre1de 
and Scott in Moments 1n the Rhetoric of the Cold War· 
Under some conditions, many short exposu~es to parts of 
an argument may be more effective than one long exposition 
of a complete argument. In add1t1on, the placing of an argument 
1nto a variety of contexts ..• may enhance its effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the gradual unfolding of an argument may give it 
momentum, each appearance of the theme enhances the cumulative 
effect of the wta 1 argument. F1 na 1 ly, by expos 1 ng the l 1 s tener 
to bits and pieces of an argument, a speaker may encourage h1s 
interest and involvement, which the listener would not feel 1f 
he heard the fully developed argument in one continuous passage 3 
Although a review of the drafts of the two national addresses clearly shows 
that each resulted from a basic draft being processed 1.hrough certain 
members of the Truman staff, it 1s also clear that Truman agreed with the 
content and arrangement of the speeches because he made many changes 1n 
Lhe drafts sent for his approval~ 
Truman 1 s dee l me rn popu la n ty fo 11 ov,n ng Amen can rnvo l vement 
1n ~he Korean Conflict d1d not occur because he failed co explain the 
war adequately. Although he did not present h1s addresses with the 
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American audience exclusively in mind, the decline was inevitable 
The lack of a correlative identification level (meaning that American 
sacrifices could not be directly attributed to the Communists) clearly 
1dent1f1ed Truman with the problem. Whether faulting him for inadequate 
preparation or for making a bad decision, the people had no one else to 
attack or to blame. One does not blame the Congress for opposing the 
President, for Congress is not a person and therefore not susceptible to 
blame or responsibility. It was all too obvious that Truman was aware 
of this in his following comments: 
Having served 10 two branches of government, legislative 
and executive, I think I am expressing a considered and impartial 
op1n1on 1n saying that the powers of the President are much more 
difficult to exercise and preserve from encroachment than those of 
the Congress. In part, this d1ff1culty stems from the problems of 
our time and from the fact that upon the President falls the 
respons1bil1ty of Dbta1n1ng action, timely and adequate to meet 
the Nation's needs. Whatever the Constitution 4ays, 1t 1s the President who 1s held responsible for disaster. 
In another comment about the conflict that 1s inherent betweer the 
President and the Congress, Truman explains that conflict 11 is not a bad 
thing; o~ the contrary~ 1t 1s a good thing for the preservation of the 
liberty of the people--as long as it does not become conflict for its 
own sake 115 
Not even the President of the United States 1s capable of ma1nta1n1ng 
a favorable public image 1n the face of systemat1cally biased and often 
erroneous charges from sources having moderate to high cred1 bi l ity., The 
nature of the s1tuat1on faced by Truman with certain members of Congress 
1s well represented 1n the following statement by President Eisenhower· 
We came into power, the Republicans did, for the first time 
1n twenty years. There was not a single SenatorJ R~publ1can 
Senator 1n the Senate who had ever served with a Republican 
President. Now, as a result~ they were raised in this trad1t1on 
of antagonism betw2en the Executive and the Legislature, and 1t 
tvas very 3 very d1ff1cult for the Republican Senators, at -first, 
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to remember that their Job was now to cooperate with the President 
and he vn th them On the contrary, they Fe$ t that they had to 
cut him down, at first, it was instinctive. 
With every issue having at least two sides, it was this 11 1nstrnctive 11 
cutting down of the President that for Truman made a virtually impossible 
task totally impossible. 
In summary, it was not Truman's inab1l1ty as a rhetorician that 
brought about his decline in popularity during the Korean Conflict. Rather, 
1t was basically his decision to respond to a national threat that did not 
represent a perceived immediate threat by the population. Since the options 
had not been reduced to kill or be killed, the nature of the situation in 
Korea la eked the inducement required for the 11 w111 mg II expend, ture of 
human lives. In addition to the lack of a correlative level of 1dent1f1cat1on 
(kill or be killed), there was the matter of blame. Since Truman was Pres-
ident and the only single 1nd1vidual 1n pos1t1on to be blamed, every pain, 
discomfort, and sacrifice associated with the war could be 1dent1f1ed with 
Truman. After the in1t1al national unity fostered by the Korean decision, 
many found 1t expedient to point out the apparently obvious relac1onship 
between Truman and all that was wrong in the country. 
Truman did not f1t the mold of President and he d1d not fit the 
mold of rhetor1cian, yet in the face of seemingly impossible odds, he 
excelled in both roies. His Presidency came at a time of national 
turbulence and crisis, and 1t came at a time when mary Republicans ~ere 
so hungry for a Pres1dent1al victory that opposing a Democratic President 
became the primary mission of then public careers. Some of Trumari's 
const1tuenLS failed co grasp the essence of the man and h1s wor~ because 
they did not perce1ve either to be 1n their best interest, aDc others 
chose to ~1d1cule or ignore him perhaps because he represented an 
107 
unfaLhomable paradox But those who earnestly sought to know the 
11 common II man from Mi ssou r, found a human being of unusual qua l 1 t1 es 
and v1s1on In the words of Sir Hrnston Churchill: 11 ! m1sJudged you 
badly [at Yalta] ... Since that time, you, more than any other man, 
have saved Hes tern C1 v1 l 1 zat1 on o 117 As Pres 1 dent and as rhetori c1 an, 
Harry S. Truman was truly an uncommon man. 
Foowotes 
1Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive Speech (New York: 
Longmans~ Green and Co., 1957), p. 48. -
2Ar1stotle, Rhetoric 11. 5. 
3wayne Brockriede and Robert L Scott, Moments rn the Rhetoric 
of the Cold War (New York: Random House Inc , 1970), "p:- 36. 
4Harry S. Truman, Mr. C1t1zen (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 
1960) , p O 223. 
5 Ib1d .. 
6oprn1on expressed by Dwight D. Eisenhower during CBS Ne 1v'JS Special, 
11 The Long War: Congress vs. the President ,U March 19, 1973,. 
7Alfred Steinberg~ The Man from M1ssour1 (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1962) !) pp. 11-12. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aristotle. Rhetoric. Translated by ~J. Rhys Roberts. ' - Great Books 
of the Western World. Vol IX. Edited by Robert M. Hutchins. 
Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952. 
Berstein, Barton J. Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration. 
Chicago· Quadrangle Book~l970. --
, and Matusow, Allen J. The Truman Administration. A Documentary 
----H-1story. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 
Bitzer, Lloyd F. 11 The Rhetorical S1tuation. 11 Philosophy and Rhetoric, 
I (January, 1968). 1-14. 
Brockr1ede, Wayne, and Scott, Rober~ L. Moments.!.!:!_ the Rhetoric of the 
Cold War. New York: Random House, 1970. 
Burke, Kenneth. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley· University of 
Cal1forn1a Press, 1969-.-
--~-· The Philosophy of Literary Form. 2nd ed., revised. New York. 
V1ntage Books, 1957. 
Carid1, Ronald J. The Korean War and American Pol1t1cs. Ph1ladelph1a. 
Un1vers1ty of Pennsylvani-a-Press, 1968. 
Druks, Herbert From Truman through Johnson: A Documentary History. 
New York: Robert Spe 11 er and Sons, 1971 . 
. Harry S. Truman and the Russ 1 ans, 1945-1953. New York· 
---R-ob-ert Speller and Sons, 1966. 
Eisenhower, Dw1ght D "The Long War· Congress vs. the Pres1dent. 11 CBS 
News Special, March 19, 1973. 
11 Amen ca I s Comm1 tment. 11 Forwne, August, I 950, p. 54. 
11 The Forcune Consumer Outlook/' Fortune, August., 1950, pp. 57-60 
Futer, Howard B. Harry Truman 1884-. Nevi York. Oceana Publ1cat10ns, 1970. 
Goldman, Eric F The Crucial Decade. New York Vintage Books, 1960. 
Harper, Alan D The Pol1t1cs of Loyal~y Westpo1nt 9 Connecticut 
Greenwood Pub11shrng Cotporat1on:i 1969. 
Hartman, Susan M. Truman and the 80~h Congress Columbia~ M1ssour1 
Un 1 vers l ty of Ml ssounPres s-:-7971 
l U3 
l 09 
H1gg1ns, Trumbull Korea and the Fall of MacArthur. New York Oxford 
University Press, 1960. -----
Koenig, Louis W , ed. The Truman Administration. New York· New York 
University Press,7956. 
"Why are we taking a beating?" L 1 fe, July 24, 1950, p. 21. 
Mooney, Booth. The Pol1tic1ans· 1945-1960. New York J.B. L1pp1ncott, 
1970. 
Neustadt, Richard E. Pres1dent1al Power. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1960. 
New York Times, August 30, 1950 
Nichols, Marie Hochmuth. Rhetoric and Crit1c1sm Baton Rouge· 
Louisiana State University Press, 1963. 
Oliver, Robert T. The Psychology of Persuasive Speech. New York: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1957 . 
. Why War Came in Korea New York· Fordham Un1vers1ty Press, 
---,-950.---- -
Paige, Glenn D. The Korean Dec1s1on New York. The Free Press, 1968. 
Papers on Gallup Poll, American Institute of Public Op1n1on, Truman 
Library, 1945-1953. -
Phi 111 ps, Cabe 11. The Truman Pres 1 dency. New York: Macm1111 an, 1966. 
Public Papers of the Presidents· Harry~ Truman, 1950. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1965. 
Rees, David. Korea· The Limited War. London. Macm1llian, 1964 
Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War. New York. Doubleday, 1967. 
Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford 
Un1vers1ty Press~960. 
Spanier, John W The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and The Korean War. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts· The Belknap Press of Harvard Un1vers1ty 
Press :i 1959 
Steinberg, Al Fred 
Sons, 1962 
The Man From M1ssour1. New YorK· G. P. Putnam's 
1'Harry S. Tru'i1a11,1 1 lJorld Book Encyclopedia Vol XVTII 1966 
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman 
Ga~den C1t1 , New YorF Doubleday) 1956. 
Vol 1 Year of Oec1s1ons 
110 
. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Vol II. Years of Trial and 
---H-ope. Garden City !l NewYork. Doub 1 edai:-T956 . 
. Mr. C1t1zen. New York Bernard Geis Associates, 1960. ----
Truman, Margare~. Harry S. Truman New York· W1ll1am Morrow and 
Company, 1973. 
Twedt, Michael S. 11 The War Rhetoric of Harry S. Truman During the 
Korean Conflict." Unpublished PhD. d1ssertat1on, Un1vers1ty 
of Kansas, 1970. 
